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AND ITS EFFECT ON CLOSE
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INTRODUCTION

In 1988 the NewJersey Legislature enacted a comprehensive
revision of the New Jersey Business Corporation Act (Act) which
alters many of its provisions as last revised in 1973. According to
the New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education the
1988 revision affects fifty-eight sections of New Jersey Statutes
Title 14A (Title 14A) and creates twelve new sections. It is therefore not surprising that Public Law 1988, Chapter 94 which enacted the new law, has been popularly called the Revised New
Jersey Business Corporation Act (Revision).
Needless to say, the Revision constitutes a significant alteration of the previous law. This is true despite the fact that the
Corporation Law Revision Commission (Commission) which
proposed many of the new provisions, and whose recommendations were largely, but not completely, followed, characterized
"[m]any of the proposed amendments [as merely] of a housekeeping nature, eliminating ambiguities or clarifying existing
provisions in Title 14A."'
The only two proposed changes accepted by the New Jersey
SA.B. Yale, 1949; J.D. Columbia,

1952; L.L.M. New York University, 1959;

Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; Member of the New Jersey
and New York Bars.
This article will form the basis for a new section in the author's book, New
Jersey Close Corporations, published by Callaghan & Co., Wilmette, Illinois.
I See REPORT OF CORPORATION LAW REVISION COMMISSION AND COMMISSIONER'S
COMMENTS TO PROPOSED

REVISION

OF THE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW OF NEW

JERSEY (February 1986) [hereinafter REPORT]. The members of the Commission

were John R. MacKay II, Chairman, Thomas J. Bitar, and Jack Borrus. Ronald H.
Janis was Secretary to the Commission, and William F. Campbell was a consultant
to the Commission. The text of the Report, with its proposed changes in the Business Corporation Act ("BCA"), and Comments thereto, was widely circulated. It is
also set forth in Appendix Ill(A) of the current Supplement to Kessler, New Jersey
Close Corporations.
Although not all of the Commission's recommendations were adopted, the
overwhelming majority were, although in certain cases the numeration system was
modified by the Legislature as to them. Nonetheless, the Commission Report pro-
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Legislature, that the Commissioners characterized as "worthy of
special mention," were those permitting directors to have two or
more votes (New Jersey Statutes Annotated (NJSA) 14A:6-7.1)
and the elimination of "the archaic notion of stated capital and
the related concept of par value" (principally in NJSA 14A:7-8.1
and 14A:7-14.1).

2

vides invaluable guidance on the interpretation of not only those provisions proposed by the Commission which were adopted, but also those that were not.
The Senate Judiciary Committee Statement to P.L. 1988, c. 94 (caveat: item 4
of the major changes, which seems to be erroneous in its statement that "limited"
may now be used in the corporate name, when the statute instead only expressly
authorizes the abbreviation "Ltd.") is also of value.
The Senate Labor, Industry and Professions Committee Statement to P.L.
1989, c. 17 is also instructive as to the more recent changes made in the Revised
BCA by that law.
2 It should be noted that, as suggested above, even where the substantive recommendations of the Commissioners were accepted, the Legislature has, in some
instances deviated from the numeration system proposed by the Commission.
Thus, for example, the Commissioners' identical proposal for the changes in N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:1-2 were instead incorporated in a new section designated N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:1-2.1, and old section N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:1-2 was completely
repealed. Similar changes were also made in numeration with regard to N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:6-7, 7-8, 7-14, 10-4 and 10-5 which was proposed merely to amend, but
the Legislature, although accepting the Commission's substantive changes, decided
to completely repeal, substituting new N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-7.1, 7-8.1, 7-14.1,
10-4.1 and 10-5.1, respectively. Also, the Legislature chose to use N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:8-2.1 and 8-3.1 to replace the Commission's N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:8-2 and
8-3, which were used by them to close up the numerical gap between the enacted
repeal (following the Commission's adopted recommendation), of old N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:8-1.1. 8-2, 8-3 and 8-4.
Corresponding cross reference changes to the Legislature's numeration system
were, for example, made in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10-7, 11-1, 11-2 and 11-3. A
similar renumbering procedure has also been used with certain subsections of the
statute. Illustratively, the Commissioners proposed to delete subsections (3), (4)
and (5) of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-4 and renumber subsection (6), as amended, to
become subsection (3). The Legislature adopted the Commission changes, but
simply deleted subsections (3), (4) and (5) without renumbering subsection (6).
This has also been the technique generally adopted, but should not interfere
with comprehension of the substantive changes introduced by the new law as a
result of the Commission Report, and reflected in that report.
The Legislature, however, also made a number of substantive changes in those
proposed by the Commission. Among these substantive changes made by the Legislature to the Revised New Jersey Business Corporation Act, as originally enacted
(L 1988, c. 94), were the following: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:1-6, 14A:l-10, 14A:2-2,
14A:2-2.1, 14A:4-5, 14A:15-4 (this was not enacted). Finally, in P.L. 1989, c. 17,
the Legislature further deviated from the Commission recommendations by its
amendments to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7, 3-5, and 6-14, of the Revised New Jersey
Business Corporation Act as originally enacted.
Needless to add, some of these substantive changes in the Commission recommendations, made by the law as finally enacted, may affect the validity of the Commission's Comments to the sections thus amended. Nonetheless, as above
indicated, consultation of the Commissioners' Comments, as contained in their Re-
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Despite the Commissioners' modesty, there are, in addition
to the two they deemed noteworthy, a number of other sections
amended by the Revision which are of interest to close corporations. These, and the additional changes made by the Legislature, relevant to such corporations, will be discussed below,
together with the two that the Commission considered as more
than merely of a housekeeping nature. Both of these are of some
importance to close corporations. The ink on the Revision had
hardly dried when the Legislature again amended Title 14A
(NJSA 14A:2-7, 3-5 and 6-14), in Public Law 1989, Chapter 17.
These, too, are discussed below.
The revised corporation law as amended is extremely "liberal," in the sense in which corporation laws are characterized.
In other words, they allow the majority shareholders to do what
they want regardless of the objection of the minority. This suggests, as will be indicated below, that if it is decided as part of the
initial bargain among the participants, they should attempt to negate a number of these new provisions to allow for equal protection of the minority. Some other provisions of the Revision may,
if not countermanded, prove a trap to the majority's control.
The thrust here will be to emphasize these potential dangers to
the close corporation.
The simplest and clearest method of discussion is to proceed
with an analysis of the sections of the amended statute in their
numerical order, with certain sections not of particular importance to close corporations relegated to footnotes. Many of the
provisions of the Revision, however, are of greater importance,
or of less danger, to close corporations than others. An attempt
will be made to indicate these provisions under the discussion of
the particular sections amended and in the summary. A few sections which remained substantially unchanged, but which could
do with possible additional amendments, will also be commented
upon.
In addition, it should be noted that many sections of the Revision are in pan materia even though appearing in separate sections and different chapters. This is true of the new simplified
financial provisions generally abolishing the concepts of stated
capital, surplus, and par, which have largely here only been dealt
port, will be important to the interpretation of the new law, not only as to those
sections of that law where the Legislature has substantially adopted its recommendations, but the others it has not completely adopted as originally proposed, as
well.
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with in their functional aspects of consideration for issuance of
shares, dividends, and share repurchases.
Other provisions, following the numerical sequence of both
the old and the new law, are also similarly interrelated. Thus, the
indemnification provisions and the corporate powers to make
loans, guaranties, and contributions and the sections dealing
with relaxation in the duties of care and loyalty on the part of
corporate officials are all related, even though some appear in
Chapter Three while others appear in later chapters such as Six,
Seven, and Eight. Some attempt has been made to indicate these
relationships. In assessing the powers and duties of corporate
officials, however, a wide-ranging examination by practitioners of
the various sections dealing with particular transactions will be
needed. This is not a criticism of the old or amended statute
because it is not really possible to isolate completely corporate
power exercised by the board from the directors' powers and
duties.
CHANGES EMPHASIZED BY THE COMMISSION

Because the Commission highlighted two changes, both of
which were adopted by the Legislature, namely, the simplified financial provisions and the giving of multiple votes to the members of the board, it is perhaps appropriate to make an initial
comment on them, even though they will be discussed later, in
connection with the statutory sections to which they principally
apply. These comments can be very simple. As to the financial
provisions, in the typical close corporation with only one class of
stock, as required by the Internal Revenue Code for S corporations, the protection given by the old law to creditors and shareholders by the old requirements was so minimal that the changes
under the new law which simplify the requirements for dividends
and share repurchases are generally welcome. It will be noted,
however, that they do not give carte blanche to improvident distributions, such as those causing or during insolvency. Some of
the provisions, such as those with regard to permissible consideration for issuance of shares and dilution of senior shareholders'
rights, seem to give less than desirable protection to shareholders, and perhaps creditors.
As to the second addition emphasized by the Commission,
multiple votes for directors, the change seems unnecessary for
close corporations, if, as most close corporations will desire, the
board can instead be completely abolished. The change may also
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prove a danger since the board member, on his death for example, may lose his right to have his successor have a multiple vote
unless safeguards are provided.' This provision hardly seems to
justify the prominence given to it by the Commission. Both of
these changes emphasized by the Commission will be further discussed below.
THE PRINCIPAL STATUTORY CHANGES OF INTEREST
TO CLOSE CORPORATIONS

Now that the preliminary matters have been taken care of,
the discussion can proceed generally following the Act's chapter
and section numbers of what appear to be the most significant
changes as they impact on close corporations.
1.

General Provisions

The new definitions section (NJSA 14A:1-2.1 replacing repealed 14A: 1-2) is generally designed to delete the definitions of
capital surplus, earned surplus, net assets, and stated capital
which have, according to the Commission, now become superfluous in view of the revised financial provisions in Chapter Seven.
The general rules as to the execution, filing, and recording of
documents (NJSA 14A:1-6) have been amended primarily with
regard to the duties of the Secretary of State as to filing of these
documents. The section also permits the filer to defer the effective date of a filed document for up to ninety days, as opposed to
the previous thirty day period. NJSA 14A: 1-6(6) also now allows
use of the home address or the business address of an incorporator, shareholder, director, or officer where the address is required. 4 The Department of State can, of course, be counted on
to promulgate new forms necessary to comply with the provisions of the new law, and already has done so with remarkable
alacrity in a number of instances, such as the certificate of
incorporation.
NJSA 14A:1-8 expressly permits personal delivery to the
person to whom notices are directed in lieu of mailing, including
certified mail return receipt requested. Needless to say, it would
be wise to require the recipient to acknowledge receipt of the
notice where it is personally delivered, to obviate the necessity of
an affidavit of service in the instances where notice is required,
3 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-7.1(2) (West Supp. 1989).
4 See also id. at § 14A:4-5 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989) (pertaining to the filing of
the annual report and the effects of nonfiling).
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and not merely permitted, by the particular statutory section
involved.
NJSA 14A: 1-9 expressly authorizes and directs the Secretary
of State to "provide information and documents upon telephone
request and over the counter in accordance with sections 3 and 4
of [Public Law] 1982, [Chapter] 150."1
The growing number of attorneys who have fax machines
will be pleased to some extent, but not completely by the new
law. NJSA 14A:1-10 allows the use of a telecopy for documents
permitted or required to be filed in the office of the Secretary of
State, "except those requiring an original signature."' 6 Presumably, an original signature will, for example, be required for the
certificate of incorporation.' The general requirement that documents "be typed or machine printed" will be satisfied by a fax,
except in those cases where an original signature is required. 8
None of these provisions are earthshaking, and justify the Commission's characterization of many of the revisions as merely
housekeeping and clarifying. The last addition to Chapter One,
revised NJSA 14A:l-11, may, however, pose some problems and
is worthy of a more extended discussion.
Preclearance of Documents
NJSA 14A:l-ll now provides:
Any document required to be filed under this act may be submitted to the Secretary of State for review prior to the time
such document is formally filed. The Secretary of State shall
determine whether the document is acceptable for filing and,
if it is not acceptable, shall state why it is not acceptable. The
Secretary of State shall charge a fee for the preclearance of
documents. 9

The Commission Comment indicates:
This new section provides for the preclearance of documents to be filed with the Secretary of State. Under former

practice, the Secretary of State declined to review documents
prior to their official filing because there was no statutory authority to do so. This new section requires the Secretary of
State to preclear documents if requested to do so and autho5 Id. at § 14A:1-9 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
6 Id. at § 14A:1-10 (West Supp. 1989).
7 See id. at § 14A:2-6(1) (West 1974 & Supp. 1989) (requiring that the incorporators sign the certificate).
8 Id. at § 14A:1-6(1)(a) (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
9 Id. at § 14A:I-I1 (West Supp. 1989).
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rizes the Secretary of State to charge a fee for this service. The
fee is set forth in Chapter Fifteen.' o
This provision seems superficially desirable, because attorneys
may welcome suggestions from the Department of State as to manifest mistakes they may have made in the form of documents submitted, for example, a failure to include all mandatory provisions
required in the certificate of incorporation under NJSA 14A:2-7.
Similar seemingly innocuous language, however, was interpreted by
the departments of state in the neighboring states of Pennsylvania"
and New York12 to empower their departments to reject documents
which they interpreted to violate their ideas of what was prohibited
by the substantive law of corporations. Naturally when the leading
corporate law firms in both states found that their judgment on substantive law was being challenged by the Department of State, the
statutes of both Pennsylvania and New York were amended to expressly deny power to their respective Departments of State, except
for defects as to form in documents submitted. While it would have
been desirable to expressly limit the New Jersey State Department's
review to matters of form only, as is done now by these two other
states, the Department can probably be counted upon to reject documents only if they do not meet formal requirements, or to merely
suggest redrafting of corporate documents subject to the attorney's
final decision on whether or not they should be filed.'
2.

Formation

Chapter Two, dealing with corporate organization, is important to all corporations. The Revision introduces certain important changes in the corporate name requirements (NJSA 14A:22), certain minor, but welcome, changes in the reserved name
provisions (NJSA 14A:2-3), relatively minor changes in the formal requirements for the certificate of incorporation, and insignificant changes, mostly by a mere name change, in the fictitious
name provisions (NJSA 14A:2-2.1).
Name
Prior law (NJSA 14A:2-2a) required a New Jersey corpora1o REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
11 See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 15-1010 (Purdon 1989).
12 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 104(e) (McKinney 1989).
1 The statute contemplates that documents may be "erroneously rejected for
filing," by allowing for predating the filing to the date of original submission if so
requested. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:1-6(l)(b) (West 1989).
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tion, formed after Jan. 1, 1978, to add as a suffix to its name: "a
New Jersey corporation"; "incorporated"; "inc."; "corp."; or
"corporation". It now requires "corporation", "company", "incorporated" or an abbreviation of one of these (e.g., "corp.",
"inc.", "co.", or presumably "comp."), or "Ltd." It should be
noted that now neither "New Jersey Corporation," nor "limited"' 4 is expressly authorized. 5 Corporations already in existence under the old law will not be required to change their
corporation names.16
It would be wise for newly formed corporations to simply
add "corp.", "inc.", or if they want a classy flavor the new "Ltd."
There would seem to be no good reason for requiring your typist
to do more typing than is necessary. It is not advisable to use
"company" or one of its possible abbreviations, even though this
is now permitted, since "company" is not accepted in all states as
a proper indication of incorporation. The use of "company" may
cause problems if the corporation has any business transactions
7
in a state other than New Jersey.1
Conflicting Names
NJSA 14A:2-2(1)(b) "8' now provides:
(b) Shall [not be the same as, or confusingly similar to, the
corporate name of any domestic corporation, including a corporate name set forth in a certificate of incorporation filed in
the office of the Secretary of State whose effective date is subsequent to the date of filing, as authorized by subsection
14A:2-7(2), or of any foreign corporation, authorized to transact business in this State or any nonprofit corporation organized pursuant to the provisions of Title 15 of the Revised
Statutes or any corporate name reserved or registered under
this act] be such as to distinguish it upon the records in the ojice of the
Secretary of State from the names of otherfor profit and nonprofit domestic corporationsand for profit and nonprofit foreign corporations qualified to do business in this State andfrom the names of domestic limited
partnershipsandforeign limited partnershipsandfrom names subject to
a current name reservation or a current name registration, unless [the
14 Cf. SENATE JUDICIARY STATEMENT TO S. 2115, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, at (4)
(May 9, 1988) (noting the major changes).
15 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-2(l)(d) (West Supp. 1989).
16 See id. at § 14A:2-2(2)(a) (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
17 See In re American Cigar Lighter Co., 77 Misc. 643, 138 N.Y.S. 455 (1912);
Annual Rep. of the Att'y Gen., at 9 (1912).
18 In cases where the statute is quoted, amendments introduced by the new laws
to existing sections are indicated by italics. Deletions are indicated by brackets.
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written consent of such other domestic or foreign corporation
or nonprofit corporation or holder of a reserved or registered
name to the adoption of its name, or a confusingly similar
name, is filed in the office of the Secretary of State with the
certificate of incorporation or with the application for an original or amended certificate of authority to transact business in
this State or, in lieu of such consent,] there is filed a certified
copy of a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction
establishing the prior right of the corporation to the use of
such name in this State . . .9
The "confusingly similar" test for corporate names has been
dropped for a lesser standard. Now, the proposed name must
merely "be such as to distinguish it upon the records in the office of
the Secretary of State" from the names of other corporations and
those currently reserved or registered, as well as those of limited
partnerships."z It should also be noted that a check of filed limited
partnership names will now be necessary before a name may be chosen for a corporation.
Assumed Corporate Names
The permission for a corporation to use a business name
other than its official one has been carried over. 2 ' The section
authorizing such "fictitious" names as they were previously
called, however, has itself been subject to a name change.
Although the Commission suggested the term "trade name" as a
substitute for "fictitious name," the Legislature preferred "alternate name."
The statute appears to make no substantive
changes in the section other than expressly requiring the Secretary of State to notify the corporation of an impending expiration
of the alternate name registration, a practice already followed,
even though not mandated. Further, the statute provides that a
corporation may terminate its registration for the alternate name
should it desire to do so.
Reserved Name
Reservation of a corporate name will give the attorney
enough time to draft the papers without fear of finding out that
the name he has chosen has been preempted by someone else in
the interim. NJSA 14A:2-3(4) now allows an unlimited number
19 N.J.
Id.

STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-2(l)(b) (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).

20

21 See id. at § 14A:2-2.1 (West Supp. 1989).
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of renewals of the reservation for additional 120-day periods.
The time during which the name of a dissolved corporation,
which is in effect reserved, will be unavailable for use by another
22
corporation has been cut from two years to one year.
Certificate of Incorporation
NJSA 14A:2-7(1), dealing with the requirements for the certificate of incorporation, makes no significant changes in existing
law. Of course, consistent with the largely obsolete distinctions
between par and no-par value shares, it no longer requires that
the certificate state which are to be par and which are to be nopar (NJSA 14A:2-7(1)(c)). NJSA 14A:2-7(2) allows, consistent
with the general provision, discussed under Chapter One, a deferred effective date for the certificate of up to ninety days rather
than the former thirty days. This latter provision is ordinarily of
no importance to newly formed close corporations, which would
prefer a pre-effective filing date to avoid possible promoters' liability problems.
NJSA 14A:2-7(3) goes beyond the previously adopted (Public Law 1987, Chapter 35) provision allowing the certificate to
excuse a director from liability at least for ordinary negligence. It
should be noted that in the original revision the permitted exoneration applied only to directors and not to nondirector officers.
Now, as a result of Public Law 1989, Chapter 17, the expiring
provision for officers has been extended to apply permanently to
them as well.
It might have been well for the Legislature to have deleted
the requirement for setting forth the number of directors constituting the first board and listing their names and addresses
(NJSA 14A:2-7(h)), or those of the incorporators (NJSA 14A:27(i)). Illustratively, the number of original directors is usually
fixed at one. He will normally also be the sole incorporator and
will normally be the attorney for the corporation. Also, since the
Department of State in its official form apparently prefers that
the corporation set forth its duration, despite the fact that the
statute, even as amended, only requires that the duration of the
corporation be set forth "if other than perpetual" (NJSA 14A:27(j)), it would be helpful if the Legislature had clarified the
matter.
22 See id. at § 14A:2-2(4) (West 1974 & Supp. 1989); see also id. at § 14A:4-5(7)
(West Supp. 1989) (discussing reinstatement of the certificate after revocation by
proclamation and its effect on, inter alia, the corporate name).
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Powers

As indicated above, many of these corporate powers provisions are in pan materia with the director powers. Therefore, the
original and amended statutes dealing with Chapter Six must also
be read in conjunction with them. The consistency, such as that
in the area of guaranties of director loans, is not completely clear
and unfortunately, may require judicial resolution.2 3
Guaranties
Perhaps somewhat ironically, the provision for corporate
guaranties not in furtherance of the corporate purposes appears
to have been made stricter as a result of the new statute (NJSA
14A:3-3). Thus, such guaranties not "in furtherance of its direct
or indirect business interests" now require the unanimous vote
(rather than two-thirds) "of the votes cast by the holders of each
24
class and series of shares entitled to vote thereon.
The Commission's Comments add:
The Commission considered at length the fact that banks and
other lenders have historically been concerned about the validity of corporate guaranties. NJSA 14A:3-1(i)(g) expressly
empowers corporations to give guaranties. Consequently, a
good faith determination by the board of directors that a proposed guaranty is in furtherance of the direct or indirect business interests of the corporation should enjoy the
presumption of validity provided by the business judgment
rule. Resort to Section 14A:3-3 should not be necessary to
validate a guaranty which the board determines in good faith
is in furtherance of the corporation's business interests.2 5
The statute also adds, however, that nothing in the new section shall
be deemed to diminish the rights of the corporation's creditors.
Guaranties of loans to directors, officers, and employees are apparently not proscribed by this section unless it can be shown that they
26
may not reasonably be expected to benefit the corporation.
Corporate Contributions
NJSA 14A:3-4 has been amended to expressly allow noncash charitable contributions. Since these are, as under previous
law, limited to contributions which are reasonable, they may not
See, e.g., id. at § 14A:6-11 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
Id. at § 14A:3-3 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
25 REPORT, supra note 1, at 19.
26 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-11 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
23
24
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prove much of a danger. It appears, however, that the certificate
of incorporation may make the entire subject of corporate contributions subject to shareholder approval, which may be advisable.
Indemnification of Corporate Agents
NJSA 14A:3-5, as amended by Public Law 1989, Chapter 17,
increases to a considerable extent the corporation's power, and
in certain cases its obligation, to reimburse its corporate directors, officers, and employees when they are sued. In this regard,
it went even beyond what the Commission would have allowed.
Shareholder suits as vehicles for the vindication of participants'
rights have become less important in close corporations because
of the growing popularity in NewJersey, and other states, of statutes like NJSA 14A: 12-7, providing better remedies for "oppression" of minority shareholders. This will be discussed below.
Obviously, however, a corporation's permitted or mandatory obligation to its officials sued for alleged deficiencies in their duties
will depend directly on the duties imposed on them by the statute. To take an obvious case, if the directors have been excused
from a duty of due care under a certificate of incorporation provision, 2 7 they are more apt to be entitled to indemnification. Since
the duties of care and loyalty are, therefore, so related to indemnification, they will be discussed together under Chapter Six.
Registered Office and Registered Agent, Annual Report

4.

The duties and powers of the registered agent have been altered by the new law. NJSA 14A:4-2(4), dealing with the residences or business office addresses, address of incorporators,
directors, etc., in reports of the registered agent, has simply been
moved to NJSA 14A: 1-6 which the Commissioners believed was a
more appropriate place.
NJSA 14A:4-4, dealing with the registered agent's resignation, has been amended to require specific notice to the corporation of such resignation, and penalties to the corporation if it fails
to appoint a replacement. NJSA 14:4-5 now allows the corporation's required annual report to the Secretary of State to be executed by the registered agent, and no longer requires that the
report set forth the date of the next annual meeting of shareholders for the election of directors. This provision is welcome because the corporation's registered agent will normally be its
27

7(3)).

See supra text between notes 22 and 23 (discussing N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 14A:2-
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attorney, who will probably be more apt to respond than the corporate participants.2 8
The annual report also must set forth the address of its main
business or headquarters office, and the address of its principal
business office in New Jersey, if any. 2 9 Appropriate forms will
undoubtedly be provided by the Secretary of State. NJSA 14A:45(5), (6), (7) provide penalties for nonfiling, and reinstatement of
status. Presumably, NJSA 14A:4-5(7) will insure that, before reinstatement, the corporation will be considered at least de facto,
and therefore, not experience any difficulty with transactions entered into in the interim.
5.

Shareholders' Meetings and Elections; Rights and Liabilities of
Shareholders in Certain Cases
Voting List

The Commission proposed to amend NJSA 14A:5-8(1)(c),
the voting list section, to allow inspection by any shareholder for
"reasonable periods during the meeting," instead of during the
whole time of the meeting as under the old law, and would have
imposed the additional requirement that the inspection be for a
"proper purpose." The statute as enacted follows the Commission's recommendation as to the first change, but deletes the additional proper purpose requirement.
The Legislature made a wise choice, since there should be
no requirement for showing a "proper purpose" for seeing the
shareholder list as opposed to the other books and records of the
corporation, since it is litigation-producing, and may delay the
holding of a meeting, or, worse yet, result in a shareholder's inability to resolve the question until it is too late for him to pre30
vent adverse corporate action directed against him.
High Vote-"Veto"
NJSA 14A:5-12 has been amended to expressly allow a corporation to require unanimous shareholder vote for all shareholder action, including election of directors. Apparently, some
attorneys doubted the permissibility of such provisions under the
prior law. The author never entertained such doubts, and accordingly, these changes while welcome, are not considered sigSee N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:4-5 comment (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
See id. at §§ 14A:4-5(1)(e), (1)(f) (West Supp. 1989).
Cf. id. at § 14A:5-28 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989) (discussing the right of inspection for books and records).
28
29
30
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nificant. It should be noted, however, that such a requirement
for unanimity in the election of directors may give rise to a deadlock which will give grounds for dissolution under NJSA 14A: 127(l)(a). This suggests the need for a shareholder agreement on
the subject. 3 An alternative would be to have different classes of
stock, each class given to a participant with the right to elect its
own director without a high vote requirement. This would give a
guarantee of continued election, and immunity from danger of
removal. 3 2 Problems may, however, be posed on the death of the
holder.
Voting of Treasury Shares, and Shares of Other
Corporations Owned by the Corporation
NJSA 14A:5-13 now provides that a corporation "holding its
own shares" shall not vote them.3 3 This was a mere name change
to avoid the term "treasury shares." The Commission's Comment explains:
Section 14A:5-13 has been revised to eliminate the reference
to treasury shares. It is expected that the revisions to sections
14A:7-16 and 14A:7-18 will limit the use of treasury shares,
except, for example, when a corporation reacquires its shares
and the selling shareholder retains a security interest in the
shares as collateral for the corporation's obligation to pay the
purchase price. In such a situation, the corporation could not
vote the shares, although if the parties so provided, the selling
34
shareholder or some other person may vote the shares.
The second change in the section was to clarify the prohibition
against a corporation voting shares of other corporations which it
holds. The prohibition now applies to a corporation which holds a
majority of the shares of the other corporation, rather than a "plurality" which the Commission found ambiguous. A prohibition
against the corporation voting shares of a corporation in which it
owns a controlling interest, is necessary since otherwise the current
directors, who will vote such shares, may use this as a device to perpetuate their power. The directors might also cooperate with another corporation, in which corporation A owns corporation B, and
corporation B owns corporation A, to make themselves into self31 See id. at § 14A:5-21(1) (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).

32 See id. at § 14A:6-4(2) (West 1974 & Supp. 1989). This section can also be
used for election for a limited time, or on a contingency. See id. at § 14A:6-4 comment (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
33 See id. at § 14A:5-13 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).

34

See

REPORT,

supra note 1, at 27.
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NJSA 14A:5-13 differs from Revised Model. Business Corporation Act Section 7.21 and Delaware General Corporation Law Sec36
tion 160(c) on which the Commission's Comment says it is based.
The New Jersey statute seems to require that if corporation A owns
a majority of the shares of corporation B entitled to vote for directors, any shares of corporation A owned by corporation B will not be
voted or counted in determining the "total number of outstanding
shares" of corporation A. 37 Whether this will pose interpretive
problems, such as where corporation A's preferred stock is involved,
has apparently not been judicially construed.
Irrevocable Proxies, and Pooling Agreements
NJSA 14A:5-19 represents a clear improvement over the old
NewJersey statute, which relied excessively on the Delaware statute 38 rather than the somewhat clearer New York statute.3 9 It
formerly provided, relying on the vague Delaware language, that
a proxy was irrevocable if "coupled with an interest. ' ' 40 NJSA
14A:5-19(3) now reads:
(3) A proxy which states that it is irrevocable is irrevocable ifcoupled with an interest either in the stock itself or in the corporationand, in
particularand without limitation, ifit is held by any of thefollowing or
a nominee of any of the following:
(a) A pledgee;
(b) A person who has purchased or agreed to purchase the shares;
(c) A creditor of the corporation who has extended credit or has
agreed to continue to extend credit to the corporation ifthe proxy is given
in considerationof the extension or continuation;
(d) A person who has agreed to perform services as an employee of
the corporation ifthe proxy is given in considerationof the agreement; or
(e) A person designatedpursuant to the terms of an agreement as
to voting between two or more shareholders.
An irrevocable proxy becomes revocable when the interest which
supports the proxy has terminated.41

The enumerated specific instances where a proxy may be made ir35 See Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 673, 53 A. 842 (N.J. Ch.

1903).
36 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-13 comment (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
37 See id. at § 14A:5-13 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
38 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 212 (1989).
39 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 609(f) (McKinney 1989).
40 See N.J. Stat. Ann § 14A:5-19 (West Supp. 1989).
41 Id. at § 14A:5-19(3) (West Supp. 1989).
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revocable tracks the New York statute fairly closely, as does the Revised Model Business Corporation Act.4 2
Although the other subdivisions may be of use, subdivision
(3)(e) is probably the most important to close corporations since it
allows an irrevocable proxy to be given to a designated arbitrator to
vote the shares of a participant who refuses to vote pursuant to a
shareholder pooling agreement. 43 Thus, for example, the agreement rendered nugatory by the Supreme Court of Delaware in the
famous case of Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v.
Ringling4 4 can now be overruled by the simple device of giving the
chosen arbitrator, or the "willing parties," (the ones willing to abide
by the voting agreement) an irrevocable proxy on the shares of the
parties refusing to do so.
Perhaps use of the irrevocable proxy device will not be essential, because of the amendment to NJSA 14A:5-21(I) (the only one
made to that section by the new revision) which provides that shareholder pooling agreements shall be specifically enforceable. It
should be observed that an irrevocable proxy should be noted con45
spicuously on the share certificates.
Books and Records
Despite the fact that the Legislature chose not to adopt the
Commission's proposal for a requirement of showing a proper
purpose to see the shareholder list during a meeting of shareholders, 46 it did adopt the Commission's amendments to NJSA
14A:5-28, the general section dealing with books and records, including the shareholder list. All of the books and records, including the shareholder list, may now be kept outside the state,
and even the shareholder list is apparently subject to the shareholder's showing of a "proper purpose" for such examination.
The Commission stated that this was their intent because they
were concerned that a shareholder would try to get the list for
sale or use for a purpose "otherwise unrelated to the business of
the corporation," presumably a sucker list. 47 The "cure" given
now seems disproportionate to the danger. The shareholder will
See id. at § 14A:5-19 comment (West 1989).
essential because NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:5-21 (1) now allows specific performance of shareholder pooling agreements.
44 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947). See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-19 comment (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
45 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-19(4) (West Supp. 1989).
46 See id. at § 14A:5-8 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
47 Id. at 14A:5-28 comment (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
42

43 This provision may not be absolutely
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presumably execute an affidavit that he is not going to sell the
list, as is required under New York law. 48 But query whether this
alone will suffice to show a "proper purpose." Despite the permission given to the court to proceed summarily, the delay
caused may effectively deny the shareholder of what should be a
right to petition his fellow shareholders of record. The statute is,
therefore, an example of overkill.
At least one authority has suggested that in a close corporation any shareholder should be given the absolute right to examine not only the shareholder list, but all of the corporation's
books including its financial records. This also is excessive, since
it would allow a competitor to buy one share and use this examination to the detriment of the corporation. The solution to this
conundrum is relatively simple and should have been expressly
adopted by New Jersey; the shareholder list and minutes of
shareholder meetings, which are relatively harmless to the corporation, even if sold, should be treated differently from the books
of account and other records. The corporation should at least
have the burden of proof as to the shareholder's improper purpose with regard to the former, while the shareholder should
have the burden of proof as to the latter.4 9
Preemptive Rights
Amended NJSA 14A:5-29 does not appear to have been significantly changed. As under the old law, preemptive rights are
not available to the shareholders unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise. The certificate may, for example, confer the right on shareholders to purchase newly issued shares
sufficient to maintain their proportional interest in the corporation despite the issuance of these additional new shares. While
preemptive rights are not a guarantee of maintaining proportional control, if the shareholders lack the money to purchase the
additional shares, lack of preemptive rights will almost surely result in a dilution of their ownership interest. To take a simple
example, if a corporation has two equal shareholders and one
receives only one additional share, he will become a majority,
with all of the dominant power that gives over the other, including the newly granted power to remove the minority directors
without cause under NJSA 14A:6-6.
As under the old law, preemptive rights can, as they should,
48 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 624(c) (McKinney 1989).
49 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(c) (1983).
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be granted by a certificate of incorporation provision, if it is desired to protect minority rights. In view of the limitations on
such preemptive rights, 50 unless broadened further by the certificate, it is undesirable to merely provide in general terms that the
shareholders "shall have preemptive rights."'" It is wiser to be
specific as to all transactions that will also give rise to such a right
to purchase sufficient new shares to guard against dilution of
their interest, power or financial, in the corporation.
Judicial intervention on behalf of minority shareholders
where the minority shareholders do not have preemptive rights,
or are financially unable to exercise them, may be available to
protect them, as has been held in a number of cases. It is safer,
however, to rely upon broadened preemptive rights as a
bulwark. 5 2
6.

Directors and Officers

The chapter on directors and officers is amended by the new
law in a number of respects. Other provisions of the statute are
in pan materia with those governing directors and officers.
The first change, the amendment to NJSA 14A:6-1 which allows the corporation, subject to the provisions in the Act or the
certificate of incorporation such as NJSA 14A:5-21(2), to be managed "under the direction" of the board, rather than by it, is now
a fairly standard one in corporation statutes, and, of course, a
recognition of the practice in public issue corporations of the
need to delegate. It is of little significance to the average close
corporation where all of the directors will themselves be active in
the management of the business.
The changes in NJSA 14A:6-3 relating to the term of directors are related to amended 14A:6-4 dealing with staggered
terms for directors, and also are not of particular significance to
close corporations. Class voting for directors, however, may be
very useful to close corporations. Under a class voting scheme
each shareholder is given his own class of stock, thus protecting
him from removal under new 14A:6-6(2)(b).53 Certain of the
new provisions require more extended separate consideration.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-29(3)(d) (West Supp. 1989).
Id.
See generally O'NEAL & THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORP. § 8.10 (3d ed.
1987).
53 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-4(a) (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
50
51
52
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Vacancies and Newly Created Directorships
NJSA 14A:6-5, as opposed to 14A:6-4(2), is a possibly dangerous provision for close corporations. It carries over the old
provision that, unless otherwise provided by the certificate of incorporation or bylaws, vacancies on the board, however caused,
may be filled by a majority of the remaining directors, even
though they represent less than a quorum. Further, even a sole
remaining director is given the authority to fill a vacancy. This
provision has always been dangerous since it could result in a
complete shift in control of the corporation to one faction whenever a board vacancy belonging to the other faction occurred.
Thus, to take the simplest case, if one of two equal shareholders,
each represented on the board, die, his successor on the board
would be selected by the remaining director-participant, leaving
the survivor in complete control of the board.
With the new easy ouster provision of NJSA 14A:6-6, discussed below, this danger may be exacerbated. The removed directors will create "vacancies" on the board to be filled by the
remaining directors thus consolidating their power over the
corporation.
The statute as amended also makes it clear that vacancies
caused by an increase in the number of directors may be filled by
the remaining directors, unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws.
Packing of the board by sufficient new directors to outweigh
the opposition is now a recognized corporate device for emasculating the board of directors. Ironically, for the majority shareholders, who will be the group desiring to utilize it, the device
may prove to be a trap because the old board will, under the statute, elect the additional directors that were designed to displace
their power. The majority can save themselves from this trap by
also providing for election of the new directors by the shareholders rather than the directors. In general, unless dummies are
used, it will be advisable for close corporations to require that all
board vacancies, however occurring, be filled by the shareholders
and not by the directors.
Removal of Directors Without Cause
One of the most dangerous provisions in the Revision is
found in amended NJSA 14A:6-6. Previously, directors could
only be removed for cause by the shareholders. Only if the certificate of incorporation allowed, could they be removed without
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cause, and even then certain limits were imposed. Now, subject
to four exceptions, the rule is that any or all of the directors can
be removed without cause unless the certificate of incorporation
provides otherwise. The exceptions provide that: (1) directors
elected by cumulative voting cannot be removed unless the
whole board is removed; (2) directors elected by class vote may
only be removed by the class electing them; (3) directors elected
pursuant to a high vote can only be removed by that same high
vote and; (4) directors where the board has staggered terms cannot be removed without cause. The first three exceptions apply
to both removal for cause and removal without cause. The first
exception, however, only protects directors where the whole
board is not being removed. It is important to stress that all of
the protective exceptions can be negated by a contrary certificate
of incorporation provision.
While subsections (4) and (5) of NJSA 14A:6-6 only apply to
removal for cause, subsection (3) allows the certificate of incorporation or even a shareholder-adopted bylaw to empower directors to remove their fellow directors for cause. The upshot is
that one shareholder, owning 51% of the shares
will be permit54
ted to fire any, or all of the directors at will.
In the typical "money-brains" liaison, a minority shareholder may insist on being granted two director votes to equalize
the two given to the majority, as is now permitted under NJSA
14A:6-7.1, which will be discussed in the next section. But, will
this device offer the "brains" man making the lesser financial
contribution any protection from ouster under the easy ouster
provisions of 14A:6-6? Apparently not, unless he is given his
own class of stock which entitles him to elect his own director
possessing this multiple vote, or fits himself within one of the
other exceptions to the removal provisions of 14A:6-6. He may,
for example, insist upon a requirement of a unanimous vote for
the election of directors.
If any minority shareholders are involved in the corporation
they will be well advised to attempt to secure an amendment to
the certificate of incorporation expressly forbidding any removal
of directors without cause. Further, it should be remembered
that even a corporation with three equal shareholders will have a
minority.
54 The majority must have the power to call a meeting of the shareholders,
which it will frequently possess, see id. at § 14A:5-3 (West 1989), or proceed under

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-6 (West 1989).
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As explained in the next section, if a director is successfully
removed under NJSA 14A:6-6 his replacement will ordinarily
55
lose his multiple vote, if he is granted one as is now possible.
Multiple Director Votes
The provision of the new statute which allows multiple votes
for directors has been heralded as one of the two provisions worthy of special mention. A certificate of incorporation provision
will be required for such multiple voting. The Revisions reads:
14A:6-7.1(1) Each director shall have one vote at meetings of the board or at meetings of board committees unless
the certificate of incorporation provides the director is entitled
to more than one vote pursuant to a provision in the certificate
of incorporation consistent with subsection 14A:6-7.1(2).
14A:6-7.1(2) The certificate of incorporation may provide either that one or more directors elected by the holders
of shares of a class or series shall have more than one vote or
that the shareholders at an annual or special meeting shall
have the right to designate one or more directors who shall
have more than one vote. The certificate of incorporation
shall also specify either the number of votes which those directors shall have or that the shareholders electing those directors shall have the right to specify the number of votes which
the directors shall have. Any person appointed by the board
to fill a vacancy of a directorship with more than one vote shall
have only one vote unless otherwise provided by the certificate
of incorporation. If a director has more than one vote as provided in this subsection, any reference in this act to the vote or
act of a majority of the board, of the directors, or of the entire
board, or similar language, means the vote or act of directors
who are entitled to cast a majority of the votes.5 6
It is clear that if the certificate of incorporation so provides, a
single director or one elected by one shareholder can be given a
disproportionate vote as a director. Thus, where there are two
equal shareholders, one can be given two votes as a director while
the other is given only one. This may be especially desirable where
the shareholder given two votes as a director has contributed twice
as much to the corporation's finances as the other shareholder.
This will obviate the necessity of a "dummy" director to give the
greater control that the greater financial contributor might insist
upon.
55
56

Id. at § 14A:6-7.1(2) (West Supp. 1989).
Id. at §§ 14A:6-7.1(1), 14A:6-7.1(2) (West Supp. 1989).
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Under NJSA 14A:6-7.1 if a vacancy on the board occurs where a
director with more than one vote is involved, the certificate of incorporation should expressly provide that his replacement, if desired,
will have an equal number of votes as his predecessor. Absent such
a provision in the certificate of incorporation the replacement will
only be given one vote. The certificate should also include a provision empowering the shareholders, rather than the directors, to fill
vacancies on the board.
There is also a possible tax danger to a subchapter S election if
this new permission to give directors multiple votes is utilized, especially if different classes of stock are chosen as the vehicle.5 7 An IRS
ruling that the proposed certificate of incorporation creating such
multiple director voting rights will not disqualify the corporation
from an S election is desirable.
This new accommodation to director-power would not be necessary if the statute expressly provided for direct shareholder management proportional to shareholder ownership, rather than the
interposition of the board of directors. Unfortunately, NJSA 14A:521(2) was not amended to do so. The Commissioners' Comment,
however, states the following:
The Commission considered and rejected a proposal that
subsection 14A:5-21(2) be amended to state explicitly that the
provisions of this subsection do not constitute the exclusive
method for deviation from statutory norms with respect to
management by the board. The Commission was satisfied that
the language of paragraph 14A: 1-1 (3)(b) made such a change
unnecessary. That subsection provides that one of the underlying purposes of the Act is "to provide a general corporate
form for the conduct of lawful business with such variations
and modifications from the form so provided as the interested
parties in any corporation may agree upon, subject only to
over-riding interests of this State and of third parties ...."58
This statutory provision, adopted in 1968 as part of original Title
14A, is consistent with well-established New Jersey equitable principles. If this liberal interpretation of NJSA 14A:5-21 is accepted by
the courts as to close corporations it should be possible to abolish
the board and confide management in the shareholders, where proportional power can be more easily achieved than through the interposition of a board of directors with different votes.
The Commissioners note that the Delaware statute also allows
57 This danger may not be significant in view of I.R.C. § 1361(c)(4) (1986), and
recent IRS liberality.
58 REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
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multiple director votes. 5 9 Unlike New Jersey, however, Delaware
also expressly allows the confiding of management in the shareholders, at least as to close corporations. 6 ° It is puzzling that the New
Jersey Legislature chose to adopt one of the Delaware provisions
but not the other.
Conflicts of Interest
According to the Commissioners' Comments to amended
NJSA 14A:6-8, the changes were designed to modify the holding
of Scott v. Multi-amp Corp.,6 ' which required "fairness" in every
case despite full disclosure to the directors or the shareholders of
the transaction.6 2 A superficial reading of the amended statute
might suggest that if full disclosure is made it is immaterial that
the contract or other transaction involving interested directors is
patently unfair to the corporation or its nonfavored shareholders. It would be a mistake, however, to interpret the statute as
validating an unfair contract or other unfair transaction. The language of the initial paragraph states that the transaction will not
be invalid "solely" because the participants are interested or
common directors, or because they are parties, and therefore, the
statute will probably do no more than remove the "interest taint"
as to transactions between directors and their corporations or between corporations with common directors. Formerly in some
states, including NewJersey, such transactions were invalid solely
on the ground that such directors were involved regardless of the
fact that the transactions were fair. However, this rule that invalidity was mandated solely because a director was involved was,
according to one expert, already obsolete in most states including New Jersey, even earlier, and therefore, the necessity for such
a limited provision designed merely to validate already valid law
is questionable.63
What is the effect then of shareholder or director approval
on full disclosure of a contract or other transaction that does not
also meet the "fairness" criterion? This is not completely certain. It seems likely, however, as under previous statutes in most
59 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1983).

See id. at § 351.
386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974).
62 Id. at 66-69.
63 Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus.
LAw. 35 (1966).
60
61
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jurisdictions,6 4 the New Jersey statute will be construed not to
validate a truly unfair transaction. Perhaps the statute will be
construed to require more than mere "unfairness." Maybe it will
be necessary to prove something akin to gross unfairness, constructive fraud, if there is shareholder or director ratification pursuant to the statute, or to shift the burden of proof, as some of
the statutes in other jurisdictions expressly provide, to the ones
attacking the transaction after such approval. But, because the
statute states that a transaction will not be invalid "solely" because of the participants, this is not mandated. In short, this statute, like so many others, probably adds nothing to the already
developed common-law rules on the subject.
The statute also deletes the requirement of shareholder approval for the fixing of director compensation only if the bylaws
so provide. The Commissioners considered this limitation unnecessary since, as the report states: "Shareholders always have
the option of requiring shareholder approval for director or officer compensation. "65 It would be wise for them to exercise this
option by a certificate of incorporation or bylaw provision, since
obviously excessive director or officer compensation can prove to
be an oppressive device against the minority participants.
Place and Notice of Directors' Meetings
Obviously, there is no objection to allowing directors to participate in all or any part of a meeting of the board or a committee by conference telephone. This was advocated by the present
author in an article published in 1960.66 The problem lies in assessing which parts of the meeting the director will incur liability
for, especially if the corporation does not have an exoneration
provision. Suppose a director gets angry and hangs up. Will he
be liable for matters approved thereafter?
New York has an exemption from liability for transactions
approved while a director is absent from a meeting. The present
author's term was the "bathroom exemption." The same should
probably apply where he is disconnected or hangs up. It would
be helpful if the New Jersey statute at least stated that once a
64 See Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241
P.2d 66 (1952).
65 REPORT, supra note 1, at 29-30.

66 Kessler, The Statutoty Requirement of a Board of Directors: A CorporateAnachronism,

27 U. CHI. L.

REV.

696 (1960).
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quorum was broken, for whatever reason, a director would or
would not be responsible for later events.
Loans to Directors, Officers, and Employees
Loans to directors, officers, and employees as well as guaranties of such loans, may be made now by the board, without the
restrictions that were formerly imposed upon officers and employees who are also directors.6 7 The section does not expressly
include the proviso found in NJSA 14A:3-3 that the rights of
creditors will not be affected; nor, does it expressly allow a countermanding certificate of incorporation provision. The first limitation will undoubtedly be imposed, where appropriate, under
the bankruptcy laws or the law of fraudulent conveyances. The
second limit, at least to require shareholder approval, should be
recognized under the general provision for liberal interpretation
of the statute.6"
Needless to say, requiring shareholder approval by a high
vote will ordinarily be desired to prevent improvident loans to
controlling participants. Under appropriate conditions, such as
where the directors cannot be the subject of easy ouster, and a
sufficiently high director vote is required, all participants are represented on the board, and a high vote for director approval of
such loans is required, this may be sufficient protection. In any
event, some protection should be sought from a milking of the
corporate assets through loans to favored participants at the expense of the minority.
Reliance on Committees
NJSA 14A:6-14 now allows directors to avoid lability if, in
good faith, they rely on written reports of committees of the
board. This is in addition to the old director protections: opinions of counsel for the corporation; written financial reports prepared by independent accountants; and financial reports
represented by the appropriate corporate officers to be correct.
This slight diminution in possible director liability probably does
not represent a significant change. A much more significant
change was one that the Commission did not propose. It was,
like the provision permitted by amended NJSA 14A:2-7(3), discussed below, a reaction to Smith v. Van Gorkom, 6' also separately
67
68
69

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-11 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
See id. at § 14A:I-1 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1989) (en banc).

1989]

CLOSE CORPORA TIONS

.155

discussed below. In addition to adopting the Commissioners'
recommendation that directors and board committees may, if
acting in good faith, rely on written reports of board committees
to avoid liability the statute adds:
(3) A director shall not be personally liable to the corporation or its shareholders for damages for breach of duty as a
director if and to the extent that such liability has been eliminated or limited by a provision in the certificate of incorporation authorized by subsection (3) of N.J.S. 14A:2-7.70
Still another lessening of the danger of director liability, apparently directed to problems like those in the Van Gorkom case, was the
enactment of Public Law 1989, Chapter 17 which added an additional section to NJSA 14A:6-14. The new section reads as follows:
(4) In taking action, including, without limitation, action which
may involve or relate to a change or potential change in the control of the
corporation, a director shall be entitled to consider, without limitation,
both the long-term and the short-term interests of the corporationand its
shareholders. For the purpose of this subsection, "control" means the
possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of the corporation, whether
through
7
the ownership of voting shares, by contract or otherwise. 1

Note that section (4) apparently does not require a certificate of incorporation provision.
While this all might seem to make the balance of the section on
directors' duties and exoneration superfluous, especially if the appropriate provision under NJSA 14A:2-7(3) is placed in the certificate of incorporation, it should be noted that 14A:2-7(3), as
amended in 1989, makes the following exceptions to director and
officer nonliability, despite any contrary certificate of incorporation
provision: "[Such a provision] shall not relieve a director or officer
from liability for any breach of duty based upon an act or omission
(a) in breach of such person's duty of loyalty to the corporation or
its shareholders, (b) not in good faith or involving a knowing violation of law or (c) resulting in receipt by such person of an improper
personal benefit." 7 2 NJSA 14A:2-7, however, was also amended by
Public Law 1989, Chapter 17 to add the following:
As used in this subsection, an act or omission in breach of a person's duty
of loyalty means an act or omission which that person knows or believes
to be contrary to the best interests of the corporationor its shareholdersin
70
71
72

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-14(3) (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
Id. at § 14A:6-14(4) (West Supp. 1989).
Id. at § 14A:2-7(3) (West Supp. 1989).
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connection with a matter in which he has a material conflict of
interest.73
According to the Introductory Statement to Public Law 1989, Chapter 17, this addition was made to "prevent plaintiffs in shareholder
suits from getting around the statute by characterizing actions or
omissions which are normally considered negligence as breaches of
the duty of loyalty." ' 74 Thus, it would appear that the exculpation
from liability, even where the certificate contains the provision excusing such liability, although it can excuse liability for negligence,
may not excuse the directors, and now officers as well, from more
intentional violations of their duties. Accordingly, the statute, even
as amended, does not appear to give a complete carte blanche to
directors even if the certificate of incorporation provides a general
exculpation. This will be further discussed below. In any event, it is
probably unwise for close corporations to diminish the duties of directors to the extent of significantly eliminating those obligations
through a certificate of incorporation provision taking advantage of
NJSA 14A:2-7(3).
Reduced Director Liability and Increased Indemnification
The famous, or infamous, depending on your point of view,
Delaware case of Smith v. Van Gorkom held the directors of a public issue corporation responsible for agreeing to a takeover of
their corporation. The court held that the directors reacted with
too much speed in accepting the suitor's proposal which could,
and should have been, higher, according to the wisdom of hindsight. Director Van Gorkom, however, the prime mover in the
decision to accept the price offered, apparently received the same
amount per share as the other shareholders, no firm offer was
made for a better price, and acceptance of the offer was approved
not only by the prestigious group of outside directors, but overwhelmingly by the shareholders. The shareholders objecting to
the sale ultimately received $23.5 million on the settlement of the
action, almost half of which, $10 million, was paid by the director
and officer malpractice insurance.
Needless to say, this decision and perhaps others, together
with the consequent burgeoning costs of director and officer insurance, have understandably caused a reaction not only in Delaware but in a number of other states including New Jersey. This
73 Id.
74

Id. at § 14A:2-7 comment (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).

19891

CLOSE CORPORA TIONS

was the genesis of NJSA 14A:2-7(3), which, after a series of
amendments now reads:
(3) The certificate of incorporation may provide that a director or officer shall not be personally liable, or shall be liable
only to the extent therein provided, to the corporation or its
shareholders for damages for breach of any duty owed to the
corporation or its shareholders, except that such provision
shall not relieve a director or officer from liability for any breach
of duty based upon an act or omission (a) in breach of such
person's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its shareholders.
(b) not in good faith or involving a knowing violation of law or
(c) resulting in receipt by such person of an improper personal
benefit. As used in this subsection, an act or omission in breach of a
person's duty of loyalty means an act or omission which that person
knows or believes to be contrary to the best interests of the corporation or
its shareholders in 75
connection with a matter in which he has a material
conflict of interest.

This section is central to NJSA 14A:6-14 discussed above, as well as
14A:3-5 discussed below, to which both cross-reference. It should
be noted that a certificate of incorporation provision is required, but
that the statute now also applies to exoneration for officers, resuscitating the expiring provision of Public Law 1987, Chapter 35, allowing limitation of liability of such officers. It should also be noted
that, as indicated above, the last sentence is designed to allow exculpation for mere negligence.
The breach of duty of loyalty normally requires some intentional act such as the preemption of a corporate opportunity and
insider profits. It also includes, however, conflicts of interest, and
this, in turn, includes interested and interlocking director transactions. Although the section seems designed also to relax the standard under which a director or officer will be held liable for
breaches of duty, the effect on such transactions as the compensation of directors and officers, and other interested and interlocking
directors' contracts, NJSA 14A:6-8, is by no means certain. It can be
argued that in such matters the director, or perhaps an officer, always has a material conflict of interest.
Another part of the director liability relaxation is found in the
expansion of the already generous indemnification provisions for
corporate agents, including directors and officers. The Commission
made some recommendations for broadening indemnification. The
legislature went beyond those recommendations when they adopted
75

See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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the revised Act and even further by enacting Public Law 1989,
Chapter 17, amending that Act. The 1989 Law consisted of a package of three amendments, NJSA 14A:2-7, 14A:3-5, and 14A:6-14.
All of these provisions relaxed the standard of duty for corporate
agents, and increased their rights to be compensated if they are
sued.
Although there were other changes in NJSA 14A:3-5 76 the most
important seems to be NJSA 14A:3-5(8), which now clearly allows
what is called "contract indemnification." It now provides:
(8) The indemnification and advancement of expenses
provided by or granted pursuant to the other subsections of
this section shall not exclude any other rights, including the right
to be indemnified against liabilities and expenses incurred in proceedings
by or in the right of the corporation, to which a corporate agent may

be entitled under a certificate of incorporation, by-law, agreement, vote of shareholders, or otherwise; provided that no indemnification shall be made to or on behalf of a corporate
agent if a judgment or other final adjudication adverse to the
corporate agent establishes that his acts or omissions (a) were
in breach of his duty of loyalty to the corporation or its shareholders, as defined in subsection (3) of N.J.S. 14A:2-7, (b) were not

in good faith or involved a knowing violation of law or (c) resulted in receipt by the corporate agent of an improper personal benefit.7 7
The amended provision of NJSA 14A:2-7(3) is set forth above.
Thus, NJSA 14A:3-5(8) now clearly appears to authorize contract indemnification by the corporation where, for example, a director is held liable for his negligence in a shareholder's derivative
action. Further, indemnification appears to be authorized in cases
such as Van Gorkom even where the director has been negligent. In
effect, contract indemnification of the wrongdoers for the judgment
in a derivative action is an antilogy. The corporation's position is
that it does not want the money that the court has awarded, but
instead returns it to the wrongdoer!7 8
Before enactment of the oppression statutes, actions by shareholders in a close corporation were frequently the only effective
76 The indemnification provisions have also been broadened to provide for indemnification of corporate agents involved in the running of employment benefit
plans. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(l)() (West Supp. 1989).
77 Id. at § 14A:3-5(8) (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
78 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5(4) already mandated indemnification where the
corporate agent was "successful on the merits or otherwise." Id. at § 14A:3-5(4)
(West 1974 & Supp. 1989). This might, for example, mandate indemnification of a
guilty director who won on the statute of limitations.
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means for minority shareholders to guard against depredations by
the majority. With adoption of statutes such as NJSA 14:12-7, this
remedy seems less necessary for close corporations. Because these
suits are more apt to be a mere blackmail device in close corporations, as well as indemnification for them, it may be desirable to
deny, in advance, all indemnification rights to the extent permitted
by NJSA 14A:3-5(11).
Removal of Officers
A significant revision to NJSA 14A:6-16 removes the limitation on an officer's contract rights even where he is removed for
cause. Formerly, those rights were only preserved where he was
removed without cause. Since cause is an uncertain term, and
therefore, itself litigation-producing, it is probably wise that the
statute now leaves to the contract the determination of the
grounds on which an officer can be fired. Otherwise, the old statute might possibly have been used as a justification for ouster of
a minority shareholder from financial participation in a corporation that he has helped to set up. In any event, the statute itself is
silent on these points, and therefore, prudence probably dictates
use of an employment contract which spells out the grounds for
dismissal of officers and other participant-employees and which
defers issuance of stock until it has been earned. The last paragraph of the Comment to NJSA 14A:7-5, however, suggests that
once the shares are issued, even though for a mere promise of rendition of future services, the recipient will be entitled to full ownership rights, subject to a possible corporation rescission right,
only if so provided in the contract. Illustratively, this condition
subsequent may well not be exercisable until it is too late to prevent the service contributor from sharing equally in a liquidation
with the capital contributor even though he has not fully
performed.
The final paragraph of the Comment states:
Under the revision to new section 14A:7-5(1), shares will
be fully paid in all instances where the consideration specified
has been received. For example, shares issued for future services will be fully paid upon receipt of the promise of performance of future services; shares issued for a promissory note
will be fully paid when the promissory note is executed and
delivered. The board of directors may wish to provide for specific remedies for the recapture of such shares in the event that
there is a breach of the promise. For example, the corporation
may wish to retain in escrow shares issued for the promise of
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performance of future services until such times as those future
services are performed. An escrow arrangement would not indicate that the shares had not been fully paid, but rather would
provide the corporation with a means of recapturing the
shares in7 the event there was a breach of the promise to
perform.

It should be observed in this connection that, from the point of view
of the capital contributor, a well-drafted employment contract for
the participant who will contribute services may be more advisable
than giving him shares for his future services or his note as is now
also permitted.8 0 Such an employment contract can give more assurance of performance of the agreed-upon service contribution
than the immediate issuance of shares to him in exchange for his
naked promise to make his contribution later.
7.

Shares and Dividends

The amendment to NJSA 14A:7-3(7) deletes the reference to
treasury shares and hardly seems significant enough to mention.
NJSA 14A:7-18(1), however, still refers to treasury shares, as
does NJSA 14A:9-1(2)(p).
NJSA 14A:7-4 dealing with the quantum of consideration
and NJSA 14A:7-5 dealing with the quality of consideration are
related. Both pose certain dangers not only to creditors, but
even to fellow shareholders in a close corporation, and are therefore, dealt with together under a separate heading below. This is
also true of NJSA 14A:7-7, 14A:7-9 and 14A:7-15.1"' and they
are therefore mentioned under this subheading as well. NJSA
14A:7-6 deals with redeemable shares and again justifies a separate heading.
Returning to the numerical sequence, a brief discussion of
amendments to NJSA 14A:7-11 and amendments which perhaps
should have been made to NJSA 14A:7-12, the share transfer restrictions section, is given, before what is probably one of the
most significant changes in the financial provisions of the revised
statute, new NJSA 14A:7-14.1, captioned "Limitations on Distributions to Shareholders", dealing with the corporation's right to
pay dividends and repurchase its shares.
79 REPORT, supra note 1, at 46.
80 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-5

(West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
81 In a clarification of prior law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-15.1 does perhaps offer
some greater protection from share dividends, divisions and combinations than

under previous law. However, it is wise for close corporations to, at least, require
unanimous shareholder approval of all such possibly abusive devices.
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The corporation's authority to pay dividends (NJSA 14A:715) and its right to acquire its own shares (NJSA 14A:7-16) are
now hardly more than cross-references to new NJSA 14A:7-14.1
except for the payment and security provisions of the latter
(NJSA 14A:7-16). They will be discussed together in the concluding segments of this chapter.
Consideration for Shares
Under the old law, shares could be legally issued by a corporation for cash, real property, tangible or intangible property (including stock of another corporation), labor, or services actually
performed for the corporation or in its formation. Now, labor or
services to be performed and obligations of the subscriber or another person, secured or unsecured, will also constitute sufficient
consideration for the issuance of new shares and a new employee's termination of employment with his old employer or acceptance of employment with the new corporation are expressly
made to qualify as adequate consideration. 8 2 This is a reversal of
prior policy which expressly prohibited future services and obligations even of the subscriber himself as sufficient consideration.
The new statute undoubtedly increases the flexibility of corporate financing, especially when it is used to bring in a new
owner, for example, a good salesman, who does not have enough
cash to contribute an equal cash share for that of the "money
man." This is a typical symbiotic relationship in the close corporation. The permissiveness of the new section, however, should
be used with caution. There is a danger that the initial service
shareholder will not perform any promised future services or that
he will be unable to pay the promissory note given for the shares.
Moreover, the note of the third party may be uncollectible. Even
if nonperformance provides for cancellation of the shares, as apparently it may 83 for the initial shareholder brought in, and acceptable to the other present shareholders, there is a danger that
the device may be used as a form of nepotism for the majority to
82 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-5 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
83 See id at § 14A:7-5 comment (West 1974 & Supp. 1989); see also id. at § 14A:74 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989) (discussed below making the "good faith judgment" of
the directors conclusive on the value of the consideration for shares). The possible
adverse tax consequences of attempting to take advantage of the permission to issue shares under the new dispensation should be noted. But see id. at § 14A:7-5(2)
(West 1974 & Supp. 1989) (stating that once the "consideration" has been given
the shares shall be fully paid and nonassessable).

162

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 20:130

dilute the interests of the existing minority shareholders through
the issuance of new shares to a new favored employee.
The permission to issue shares in exchange for future services seems to have originated with an article by Professor Herwitz.8 4 It is similar to Revised Model Business Corporation Act
Section 6.21(b), and the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act Section 501. Although the Revised Limited Partnership Act
has been adopted with certain modifications by NewJersey (NJSA
42:2A-1 et seq., as amended by Public Law 1988, Chapter 130),
and this might seem to create a desirable parallel, it should be
noted that the same danger does not exist from issuance of limited partnership interests for future services as there is from such
issuance for shares in a corporation. In a partnership, even a limited one, as opposed to a corporation, someone will be personally liable for all of the business debts of the enterprise.
Even Herwitz, despite his advocacy of the issuance of corporate shares in exchange for future services, concedes that they
may pose problems even for fellow shareholders, in addition to
creditors, if, for example, the corporation is dissolved shortly after formation, even though it has no liabilities. Thus, to take a
simple example, if A and B are equal shareholders, A paying cash
for his shares, while B has been issued his shares for future services, on dissolution he will presumably be entitled to half of the
assets of the corporation.
While the statute now requires a good faith judgment on the
part of the board or the shareholders as to the value of the consideration to make it conclusive, as opposed to the old law which
required fraud in the evaluation before that valuation could be
challenged, and although it can be argued that this imposes a
greater obligation on the persons fixing the value to insure its
fairness, there is no guarantee of this. In fact, the two tests, "absence of fraud" and "good faith," are often treated as identical. 5
Therefore, there may not be any real protection against improvident issuance of stock for non-cash consideration.
Accordingly, an employment contract, such as should be
used for officers, and possibly for other employees as well,
should probably be used in lieu of an immediate issuance of
shares for the subscriber's promissory notes or future services.
84 Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capitalin the Organizationof a Close
Corporation, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1098 (1962).
85 See CARY & EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, 1436 (6th
ed. unabridged 1988).
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The statute, however, allows the certificate of incorporation to
restrict the consideration for the issuance of shares not only by
86
the directors but by the shareholders.
In view of the increased dangers from the issuance of shares
for possibly dubious consideration, it is advisable for the close
corporation at least to restrict the consideration for their issuance. Moreover, the corporation should provide that the issuance of any new shares require unanimous shareholder approval.
Hopefully, these provisions will also apply to the less obvious dilution techniques as well.
The same considerations apply to NJSA 14A:7-7 dealing
with share rights and options, 14A:7-9 dealing with convertible
shares and bonds, and 14A:7-15.1 dealing with share dividends
and combinations. All generally permit issuance of dilutive new
shares by the directors without shareholder approval. Needless
to say, all methods that allow the cutting up of the asset pie into
smaller pieces for the current shareholders pose potential dangers to the financial interests and control of the minority. They
should, therefore, be guarded against by granting a veto to the
initial shareholders to prevent such addition of the initial shares
without their approval.
Redeemable Shares (NJSA 14A:7-6)
Shares redeemable at the option of the corporation (callable) are fairly common. Some jurisdictions, however, limit the
issuing of callables or at least the right of the corporation to call
common shares. Shares redeemable at the option of the holder
are less common. New Jersey originally allowed them but only,
with certain exceptions, in corporations with fewer than twentyfive shareholders. Now, any corporation may provide for both
types of redeemable shares. A certificate of incorporation provision is required for both callable shares and those redeemable at
the option of the shareholder, that is, those as to which he has a
"put". Note that only a majority vote is required to make shares
redeemable, whether a "call" or a "put" is provided for, but cancellation of a "put" requires the approval of all the shareholders
to whom it has been given. Both varieties of redeemable shares
may be useful to facilitate share repurchase agreements, but they
would seem unnecessary in a close corporation in view of the liberal share transfer restriction provisions of NJSA 14A:7-12, espe86

See N.J.

STAT.

ANN. §§ 14A:7-4(i), -4(2) (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
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cially subsection (3)(b), which expressly validates such share
repurchase agreements.
The new provision also presents dangers from redeemable
shares. For example, the majority may authorize a new class of
redeemable shares to favor a particular shareholder, who would
be able to "put" his shares, which specifically requires the corporation to repurchase them whenever he wanted, while the other
shareholders' investments are locked in. Although discriminatory treatment by the majority against the minority may perhaps
be countered by judicial intervention, this requires litigation.
Therefore, to guard against dangerous provisions the corporation should enact a prohibition against the issuance of redeemable shares without prior unanimous shareholder approval.
Further, the corporation should require unanimous shareholder
approval for any amendment of the certificate of incorporation,
especially as to this matter. Needless to say, if all of the shareholders agree that they desire to take advantage of this device,
they can all effectively agree to adopt it. 7
Uncertificated Shares
NJSA 14A:7-11 allows for the issuance of uncertificated
shares rather than share certificates in the usual form. Uncertificated shares are typically evidenced by IBM cards or some similar
computer-generated device. These may now be used in place of
the elaborately engraved form of certificates usually appearing in
corporate outfits purchased on incorporation."' These uncertificated shares, however, are only of use to public issue corporations, not close corporations.
Share Transfer Restrictions
The only change in NJSA 14A:7-12 was to make provision
for uncertificated securities as noted above. Share transfer restrictions are vital to close corporations for a number of reasons.
Such restrictions insure the "closeness" of the corporation.
They insure that one of the initial participants will not be allowed
to foist on the remaining ones a new and possibly discordant participant whose interests may not only be very different from
theirs, but, to take the worst scenario, whose unwillingness or
87 The device may, for example, be useful as part of a share purchase arrangement in a close corporation.
88 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 8-102 (1989).
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inability to make a positive contribution may result in the failure
of the corporation.
The most effective, but also the most stringent, preventive
measure for such a danger is a requirement that all of the remaining shareholders, or at least the controlling ones through their
corporation, approve any transfer of the shares from the original
shareholders. This is called a "consent restraint," and is expressly permitted by NJSA 14A:7-12(3)(c) which does not impose
any limitations. An obstacle to the enforcement of the subsection
was, however, created by a NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division case seriously qualifying such consent restraints. There
were no changes enacted by the Revision in this statutory section,
except to permit restrictions to be available for corporations issuing uncertificated securities, a device not usually used by close
corporations.
NJSA 14A:7-12(3)(c) could have been expressly amended to
overrule Hill v. Warner Berman & Spitz, P.A. ,89 which invalidated a
consent restraint on the transfer of shares in a close corporation,
despite what appears to be a clear statutory authorization for
such a restriction, especially in the case of professional corporations. On the other hand, if the Legislature preferred to reinstitute common-law requirements for the validity of such restraints,
possibly not an unwise move, it is one which should have been
explicit. It should be noted that the Hill court also held that the
consent agreement constituted a freezeout of minority shareholders. This holding is part of the growing "close corporation
common law" discussed in the summary below.
Limitations on Distributions
With the abolition of "par" value 9 ° and the related concepts
of "stated capital" and "surplus" the law of dividends has become considerably simplified. Under the old law at least the sum
of the par values of the shares issued had to become "stated capital." For example, if 1,000 common shares were issued by the
corporation each at $1 par, the "stated capital" became $1,000.
Unless the corporation had balance sheet profits, "surplus," frequently called "retained earnings," in excess of that amount it
could not legally declare a dividend to its shareholders because it
would be considered "out of stated capital." Further, there was a
89 197 N.J. Super. 152, 484 A.2d 344 (App. Div. 1984).
90 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-8.1 (West Supp. 1989).
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limitation that the corporation not be insolvent at the time of the
dividend or made insolvent by the dividend.
Now, only the insolvency test must be met. The corporation,
however, is required to be solvent in both the bankruptcy and
equity senses. In short, its distributed assets must exceed its liabilities and also not place the corporation in a position where it is
unable to pay its debts as they become due. Thus, in the example
above, the corporation could distribute the $1,000 provided it still
retained sufficient assets to exceed its total liabilities and pay its
creditors the amounts they are owed, when they become due.
In pertinent part, NJSA 14A:7-14.1 provides:
(1) 'Distribution' means a direct or indirect transfer of
money or other property (except its own shares) or incurrence
of indebtedness by a corporation to or for the benefit of its
shareholders in respect of any of its shares. A distribution may
be in the form of a dividend, a purchase, redemption or other
acquisition of its shares, or otherwise.
(2) A corporation may not make a distribution if, after
giving effect thereto, either:
(a) The corporation would be unable to pay its debts as
they become due in the usual course of its business; or
(b) The corporation's total assets would be less than its
total liabilities.
(3) Determinations under paragraph NJSA 14A:714.1(2)(b) may be based upon (i) financial statements prepared on the basis of generally accepted accounting principles,
(ii) financial statements prepared on the basis of other accounting practices and principles that are reasonable in the
circumstances, or (iii) a fair valuation or other method that is
reasonable in the circumstances."'
NJSA 14A:7-15 now provides:
(1) Subject to any restrictions contained in the certificate
of incorporation and to the provisions of section 14A:7-14. 1, a corporation may, from time to time, by resolution of its board,
pay dividends on its shares in cash, in its own shares, in its bonds or
in other property, including the shares or bonds of other corporations [as
provided in this section].
(2) [Such dividends may be paid in authorized but unissued shares out of surplus upon the following conditions
(a) If a dividend is payable in shares having a par value,
such shares shall be issued at not less than the par value
thereof and there shall be transferred to stated capital at the
91 Id. at § 14A:7-14.1 (West Supp. 1989).
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time such dividend is paid an amount of surplus at least equal
to the aggregate par value of the shares to be issued as a
dividend;
(b) If a dividend is payable irn shares without par value,
the amount of stated capital to be represented by each share
shall be fixed by the board by resolution adopted at the time
such dividend is declared, unless the certificate of incorporation reserves to the shareholders the right to fix the consideration for the issue of such shares, and there shall be transferred
to stated capital at the time such dividend is paid an amount of
surplus equal to the aggregate stated capital represented by
such shares.] (Deleted by amendment, Public Law 1988, Chapter
94).

(3) [Such dividends may be paid in treasury shares, in
which event no transfer from surplus to capital need be made.]
(Deleted by amendment, Public Law 1988, Chapter 94).

(4) [A corporation paying a dividend in authorized but
unissued shares to the holders of any class or series of outstanding shares may at its option make an equivalent distribution on treasury shares of the same class or series and any
shares so distributed shall be treasury shares.] (Deleted by
amendment, Public Law 1988, Chapter 94).

(5) Unless the certificate of incorporation otherwise provides, a dividend may be paid in shares having a preference in
the assets of the corporation upon liquidation, whether or not
the net assets [remaining after such payment] at the time of the
share dividend are less than the aggregate amount of such prior
and newly created preferences [of such outstanding shares].
(6) [A split-up or division of the issued shares of any class
or series into a greater number of shares of the same class or
series without increasing the stated capital of the corporation
shall not be construed to be a share dividend within the meaning of this section.] (Deleted by amendment, Public Law 1988,
Chapter 94). 92

Note that only subsections (1) and (5) remain. Subsection (5) is
dilutive: It would apparently allow a dividend to be made in preferred stock with a liquidation right of $1,000 even though the common stock had assets of only $1,000, thus leaving the common with
no assets on the liquidation of the corporation! This is an unfortunate carrying over of prior law somewhat modified.9 3
While the new law makes the computation of the amount of divId. at § 14A:7-15 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
See also id. at § 14A:7-15.1 (West Supp. 1989) (concerning share dividends,
share divisions and combinations).
92
93
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idends somewhat easier, it should be noted that the directors still
may face liability if they fail to meet the solvency tests. Needless to
say, however, dividends to shareholders of the same class should be
equivalent to the number of shares they own.
Share Repurchases
The standard for permissible share repurchases is generally
the same as for dividends and other distributions. 4 NJSA 14A:716 as to share repurchases now provides:
(1) [A] Subject to the provisions of section 14A:7-14, 9 5 a corpo-

ration [shall have the right to purchase or otherwise] may acquire, [and to sell, create a security interest in, or otherwise
dispose of] its own shares, [but purchases of its own shares,
whether direct or indirect, shall be made only out of surplus,
except as provided in subsections, 14A:7-16(2), 14A:7-16(3)
and 14A:7-16(4)].
(2) [A corporation may purchase its own shares out of
stated capital for the purpose of
(a) Eliminating fractional shares;
(b) Collecting or compromising indebtedness to the corporation; or
(c) Paying dissenting shareholders entitled to payment
for their shares under the provisions of this act.] (Deleted by
amendment, Public Law 1988, Chapter 94).

(3) [A corporation may redeem or purchase its redeemable shares out of stated capital, except when after such redemption or purchase net assets would be less than the stated
capital remaining after giving effect to the cancellation of such
shares.] (Deleted by amendment, Public Law 1988, Chapter 94).

(4) [A corporation may purchase its nonredeemable
shares out of stated capital, if such shares have a preference
over the shares of any other class or series in the payment of
dividends or in the distribution of the assets upon liquidation,
except when after such purchase net assets would be less than
the stated capital remaining after giving effect to the cancellation of such shares.] (Deleted by amendment, Public Law 1988,
Chapter 94).
(5) No [purchase or redemption] (Deleted by amendment,

Public Law 1988, Chapter 94) acquisition of its own shares shall
be made by a corporation
(a) Contrary to any restrictions contained in the certificate of incorporation;
94 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
95

N.J.
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(b) [At a time when the corporation is insolvent or when
such purchase or redemption would render the corporation
insolvent;] (Deleted by amendment, Public Law 1988, Chapter 94).
(c) Unless after such [purchase or redemption] acquisition
there remain outstanding one or more classes or series of
shares possessing, among them collectively, voting rights and
unlimited residual rights as to dividends and distribution of
assets on liquidation; or
(d) In the case of redeemable shares and within the period of their redeemability, at a price greater than the applicable redemption price plus, in the case of shares entitled to
cumulative dividends, the dividends which would have accrued
to the next dividend date following the date of [purchase or
redemption] acquisition.
(6) [A corporation which has purchased its own shares
out of surplus may defer payment for such shares over such
period as may be agreed between it and the selling shareholder. The obligation so created shall constitute an ordinary
debt of the corporation and the validity of any payment made
upon the debt so created shall not be affected by the absence
of surplus at the time of such payment.] (Deleted by amendment,
Public Law 1988, Chapter 94).
(7) Unless the certificate of incorporation otherwise provides, a corporation may [purchase or redeem] acquire its
shares whether or not the net assets remaining after the transaction are less than the aggregate amount of the preferences
of outstanding shares in the assets of the corporation upon
liquidation.
(8) In connection with an agreement to acquire its shares, a corporation may grant a security interest in the acquired shares to secure an
obligation to pay for the acquisition. The shares shall not be deemed to
be reacquired by the corporation and cancelled on its books until the
obligation of the corporation is fully paid or discharged.
(9) A corporation may acquire or agree to acquire its shares,
notwithstanding that the acquisition would constitute a distribution prohibited under section 14A:7-14. 1, ifall or part of the purchase price is
deferred until such time as the payment would not constitute a prohibited
distribution.1)6
The corporate repurchaser is expressly empowered to grant a
security interest in shares it agrees to acquire to protect the repurchased shareholder's right to payment. It may agree to the purchase
even though it does not meet the solvency test provided it is able to
do so when called upon to perform. Note that in the case of dis96 N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 14A:7-16 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
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criminatory share repurchases, such as the payment of $100 to a
majority shareholder for each of his common shares and only $50 to
a minority shareholder for his otherwise identical share, judicial relief will probably be available to the shareholder discriminated
against despite the statute.9 7
NJSA 14A:7-14.1(4) and (5) provide:
(4) In the case of a purchase, redemption or other acquisition by a corporation of its own shares, the effect of a distribution shall be measured as of the earlier of (i) the date money
or other property is transferred or debt is incurred by the corporation, or (ii) the date the shareholder ceases to be a shareholder with respect to the acquired shares. In all other cases,
the effect of a distribution shall be measured (i) as of the date
of its authorization if payment occurs 120 days or less following the date of authorization, or (ii) as of the date of payment
if payment occurs more than 120 days following the date of
authorization.
(5) A corporation's indebtedness to a shareholder incurred by reason of a distribution made in accordance with
this section shall not be subordinated to the corporation's indebtedness to its general, unsecured creditors except to the
extent subordinated by agreement.9 8
It is not completely clear whether subsection (5) was also designed
to apply to dividends and other distributions. The report of the
Commission does not make it completely clear where the provision
was meant to be inserted.
Subsection (5) was apparently originally marked for insertion
under NJSA 14A:7-12, the section dealing with transfer of shares
and restrictions on transfer. It now, as enacted, appears under
14A:7-14.1, the section captioned "Limitations on Distributions to
Shareholders." This is the general section applicable to all distributions including, for example, dividends, repurchases of shares, and
redemptions.9 9 The Revisers' Comments to NJSA 14A:7-14, which
became 14A:7-14.1, also indicate that subsection (5) was intended
to apply to all "distributions." It is clear, however, that the subsection at least applies to a debt instrument given by the corporation in
exchange for a repurchase of its shares from a shareholder provided
that the other conditions of NJSA 14A:7-14.1 are met. In this manner subsection (5) attempts to resolve a problem that frequently
97 See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company, 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505
(1975).
98 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:7-14.1(4), -14.1(5) (West Supp. 1989).
99 See id. at § 14A:7-14.1(1) (West Supp. 1989).
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posed trouble in the past. 0 0
The question is the time when the propriety of payment of an
installment debt instrument should be determined. If the repurchase would be legal at the time of repurchase, is the corporation's
note for the repurchase price rendered invalid for the balance of the
purchase price if it would no longer be legal to make the purchase at
the later time when payment on the note is due? Unless there is an
agreement between the corporation and the repurchased shareholder to the contrary, an unlikely occurrence, the shareholder receiving the note for his shares will now generally be entitled to share
on a parity with the corporation's general, unsecured creditors.
This is true even though the corporation may later become insolvent, provided it was not insolvent when the note was given, at least
under the corporation law. The effect under the new New Jersey
Fraudulent Transfer Act or federal bankruptcy law is not completely
clear. While dividends are not usually paid with promissory notes
the Legislature apparently intends subdivision (5) to apply to them
as well. If the corporation is solvent at the time of declaration,
under subdivision (4) it would seem that as long as the notes provide for payment within 120 days of the declaration of the dividend,
they too will be valid even though the corporation is not solvent at
the time of payment. Payment under notes payable after 120 days of
the authorization is not certain of validity. In any event, barring
possible invalidation under laws other than the corporation law, corporate share repurchases and dividends in exchange for notes may
pose a danger of a "bailout" for the shareholders of a corporation
very close to insolvency, but not technically in violation of NJSA
14A:7-14.1 at the appropriate times.
While ordinary trade creditors will probably not protect themselves from such a drain off of their assets, significant creditors are
well advised to try to do so through the use of loan contracts limiting corporate share repurchases and dividends.
It should be noted that not even the liquidation rights of preferred shares are protected.'
Thus, apparently, a dividend or
share repurchase can be made on the common shares out of the
assets properly belonging to preferred shareholders. 0 2 This is even
100 See CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 85, at 1383-1398.
101 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-14.1(1), :7-16(7) (West Supp. 1989).
102 According to the comment, due to the fact that this is deviating from the
Model Act, the liquidation preferences of preferred shares will not be treated as
debt. This result does not seem pellucid from the statute. However, if intended,
this will make it more difficult for the corporation to "flunk" the balance sheet test
of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-14.1. For example, it will make it more difficult to hold
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more liberal than that allowed under the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act. Presumably, preferred shareholders can protect
themselves in the certificate of incorporation by not allowing any
corporate distributions that result in impairment of their liquidation
preferences. Obviously, this is advisable for them.
8.

Employee Benefit Plans

The principal change in Chapter Eight is to permit directors
or a committee of directors to approve and terminate employee
benefit plans without shareholder approval.' 0 3 The Revision also
allows this power to be confided in the officers, except where the
10 4
plan calls for the issuance of shares.
The practical viability of such plans is to a considerable extent dependent on federal law, such as the income tax laws, ERISA, and possibly the securities laws. The greater simplicity of
the new statute might be welcome because the expert guidance
of specialists on the other aspects of the laws involved will in all
events be needed. To insure that the necessary specialized advice is sought, however, it may be wise to continue to require
shareholder approval as under the old law. Although the statute
does not expressly allow the corporation to require such shareholder approval, a certificate of incorporation requirement to
that effect should be valid.10 5 As an extra precaution the requirement for director unanimity for approval of such plans should
also be required.
9.

Amendments, Changes, or Alterations
Amendment of Certificate of Incorporation

The only significant change in NJSA 14A:9-1(2)(c) is a minor
one. It gives the corporation the power "to change the duration
of the corporation even if such duration has expired to a limited
or perpetual duration.' 0 6 Unfortunately, the section does not
include the provision found in New York Business Corporation
Law section 801(b)(14) which states that a corporation may not,
however, reduce its corporate duration. Thus, the power to do so
directors liable under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-14 for improper dividends and share
repurchases. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-15(5) (West 1974 & Supp. 1989) (discussing payment of dividends in shares having a preference).
103 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:8-1(3) (West Supp. 1989).
104 See also id.
at § 14A:7-7 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
105 See id. at § 14A:6-8 comment (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
106 The statute could, however, be clearer on the defacto status during the period
between expiration and reinstatement.
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is apparently reaffirmed and can perhaps provide those in control
with a clever blackmail device through a threat to reduce the duration of the corporation to a time which is about to expire. It is
important to note that any objecting directors, in the absence of
some protective device, can now be removed without cause
under NJSA 14A:6-6(1). Of course, these devices presuppose
that the majority shareholder has the power to call the necessary
meetings as an officer under the bylaws.'" 7 The other amendments made to Chapter Nine in the revision do not appear to be
significant. 0 8
10.

Merger, Consolidation, Acquisition of All Capital Shares of a
Corporation, and Sale of Assets

Changes have been made in sections of the statute dealing
with mergers and consolidations (NJSA 14A:10-1, 14A:10-3,
14A:10-4.1, 14A:10-5.1, and 14A:10-7). Many of these changes
were minor. In any event, such complicated corporate fusions
are not common in close corporations unless they are being acquired by large public issue corporations. Such fusions also involve complex tax, securities laws, and antitrust problems which
are beyond the scope of this discussion.
NJSA 14A:10-12, entitled "Shareholder rights on other corporate acquisitions" giving shareholders of the acquiring corporation where it uses "its shares, obligations or other securities [to
acquire the] assets of a corporation, a business trust, a business
proprietorship or a business partnership" voting and dissenters'
rights, has been changed to conform to similar changes made in
14A:10-3. Neither provision generally requires shareholder approval unless the buying corporation increases its "voting"
shares or "participating" shares, or securities issuable upon the
conversion of the shares or the exercise of warrants or rights, to
exceed 40% of its previous "voting" and "participating shares."
NJSA 14A:10-12(2) defines these roughly as what are commonly
known as "common shares":
(a) "Participatingshares" means shares that entitle their holders
to participatewithout limitation in distributions.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-15(4) (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
Most of the changes are made to delete references to the repealed financial
concepts, and related provisions. However, numerous references to "par" have
not been changed in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:9-1(2). The general permission to defer
the effective date of filed documents, from 30 to 90 days, is made express as to
certificate amendments and related certificates. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:9-4
(West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
107 See
108
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(b) "Voting shares" means shares that entitle their holders to vote
unconditionally in elections of directors. 109
A new section, NJSA 14A:10-13, has also been added dealing
with "share exchanges." This section would seem to apply even to
close corporations where the acquiring corporation purchases the
stock of another corporation, "for cash, or other property [of the
acquiring corporation] or for any combination of securities, cash or
property.""
However, despite the requirement of director approval by both corporations, only approval by the shareholders of
the acquired corporation is required. Further, it should be noted
that under NJSA 14A: 10-12 the shareholders of the acquiring corporation will have the right to vote on, and dissent from, the plan if the
plan calls for an issue of voting or participating shares greater than
40% of its outstanding or participating shares."'
The upshot of these complex provisions on the close corporation is not completely clear, and the discussion here has admittedly
been sketchy. In most close corporation acquisitions, however, the
acquiring corporation will not issue any new shares in exchange for
the shares of the acquired business, but will instead pay for the acquired shares in cash or notes, being careful to avoid any obligations which might be characterized by the Internal Revenue Service
for tax or the SEC for securities laws reasons as "securities." In
addition, for the same reasons the purchasing corporation will not
issue any convertible securities or warrants, because these are
treated as stock. For practical reasons, the buyers will also not want
the intrusion of the old owners into the new business and the sellers
will probably want cash or the clear status of creditors given by
straight notes in preference to stock or obligations similar to stock.
While a sale of the shares by the individual shareholders to the
new owners as individuals might not bring into play any of these
sections, it will normally be desirable to have both corporations parties to the agreement, so they may, for example, bind the selling
corporation to a noncompetition agreement, and both corporations
to the accuracy of financial and corporate status, and share ownership. Also, normally the shareholders of the acquiring corporation
as well as the shareholders of the acquired business will not want the
intrusion or need for continued involvement on their part of the
shareholders of the selling business. Similar considerations will apply to the other typical method of transfer of a business, by the sale
§ 14A:10-12(2) (West Supp. 1989).
1 10 Id. at § 14A:10-13 (West Supp. 1989).
109 N.J. STAT. ANN.

111 See id. at §§ 14A:10-12 comment, -13 comment (West Supp. 1989).
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of assets. To the extent possible under New Jersey law, however,
implied assumption of the selling corporation's liabilities should be
avoided, under either the sale of stock or sale of assets method.
The simplest method of avoiding problems is, of course, to
have all of the owners of both the old business and the new one give
their consent in the purchase-sale agreement for all aspects of the
transaction, whether it takes the form of a purchasing and sale of
assets or involves the purchase or issuance of stock. Of course,
where any corporations are involved the consents should bind and
name the directors as well, even if they are not also owners. This
should, if the agreement is properly drafted, constitute the requisite
shareholder approval required under NJSA 14A:5-6 and the requisite director approval, where needed, required under NJSA 14A:67.1.
In a close corporation, as above-indicated, neither the new
owners nor the sellers will want dissenters, or nonsellers, if the
transaction involves a stock sale. Both the old and the new owners
will want a "clean break" with the old owners. Unanimous consent
on the part of all participants involved in both businesses and their
directors will obviously prevent any minority holdouts from attempting to blackmail either side, and should also avoid any
problems of additional compliance with any of these complex statutes. In short, unless all of the parties can agree to the bargain
reached, the agreement should probably not be executed. If they
can all agree, a well-drafted contract should also insulate them from
possible threats under these statutory provisions.
11.

Rights of Dissenting Shareholders

The only changes in Chapter Eleven appears to be to conform to the addition of new NJSA 14A: 10-5.1, merger of subsidiary corporation, replacing repealed 14A: 10-5.
12.

Dissolution

The changes in NJSA 14A:12-1 as amended are adequately
summarized in the Commissioners' Comments:
Subsection 14A: 12-1 (1)has been revised to reflect the addition of section 14A:12-4.1, permitting simplified dissolutions for corporations without assets and the addition of
subsection 14A:4-5(6) authorizing the dissolution of a corporation which fails to file its annual reports for two years.' 12
112

Id. at § 14A:12-1 comment (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
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The procedure to be followed with regard to dissolution for
corporations without assets is set out in NJSA 14A:12-4.1. One
should consult the Comment as to nonpayment of fees to the Secretary of State and excuse from supplying tax clearance, provided no
tax evasion is present. It is important to note that an officer may
now authorize dissolution for such a corporation without assets.
Hopefully, this ground for dissolution will not often be available.
Dissolution for Oppression
NJSA 14:12-7 is by far more important to close corporations
than NJSA 14A: 12-4.1, the latter dealing with corporations without assets. Hopefully they will be profitable.
As under the prior law, the statute allows an action for judicial dissolution to be brought: (a) where the shareholders are
deadlocked for 2 years as to the election of directors; (b) where
the directors (or those to whose management has been delegated
under NJSA 14A:5-21(2)) are "unable to effect action on one or
more substantial matters respecting the management of the corporation's affairs," such as director level deadlock, or; (c) in a
corporation having twenty-five or less shareholders, those in control, have "acted fraudulently, illegally, mismanaged the corporation or abused their authority as officers or directors or have
acted oppressively or unfairly toward one or more minority
shareholders in their capacities as shareholders, directors, of13
ficers, or employees.""
The last situation, oppression of minority shareholders, is
perhaps the most important. The others are, of course, available
where their more specific grounds are met. The possibility of
utilization of these first two grounds for dissolution may cause
the participants to hesitate about a universal veto, that is, high
vote requirements, for all shareholder" 14 and director action.
The oppression ground has also been replicated in the statutes of a number of other states. It promises to be the most fruitful source of the development of close corporation law in the
future, as will be further discussed in the Summary.
As under the prior law, the court is also empowered to offer
less drastic remedies to dissolution such as appointment of a custodian or a provisional director, and the most important, a
mandatory buyout of a shareholder's shares. Under the old law
113 Id. at § 14A:12-7 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
114 Note that shareholder deadlock as a ground for judicial dissolution is still
limited. See id. at §§ 14A:12-7(1)(a), -7(l)(b) (West 1988).
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only the corporation itself or those holding 50% or more voting
shares in the corporation, however, could move for a mandatory
buyout. Moreover, where a buyout was granted, payment had to
be made in cash. ' 5 Both have now been changed.
The Commissioners' Comments to NJSA 14A:12-7, as enacted, state:
Subsection NJSA 14A:12-7(8), which permits a court ordered purchase and sale of stock, has been revised in two
respects:
(a) The revision permits any shareholder who is a party to
a proceeding brought pursuant to section 14A: 12-7 to move to
purchase, or to have the corporation purchase, shares owned
by any other shareholder who is a party to that proceeding.
Previously, the statute permitted this to be done only by a
shareholder or shareholders owning 50% or more of the stock
of the corporation with respect to a shareholder or shareholders who were parties plaintiff in the proceeding.
(b) The purchase price to be paid in the event of a
mandatory sale may be paid over a period of time in cash,
notes, or other property. Previous law had required that the
price be paid entirely in cash within thirty days after the determination of fair value.
The Commission was concerned that section 14A:12-7 is
not operating as effectively as it might to assist in the resolution of internal disputes because of the existing limitations
that only a plaintiff's shares may be mandatorily purchased at
fair value and that the purchase price must be paid all in cash.
Although the revisions will permit a court to order the
sale of the stock of a shareholder who did not initiate an action
under this section and ultimately to provide for payment to
that shareholder on extended terms, the Commission was satisfied that a court would exercise its discretion in such a fashion only when equity and economic necessity compel such a
result.
The revision to paragraph 14A:12-7(8)(e) contemplates
that the court will take into account the interrelationship of
economic factors involved when providing for extended terms
of payment, including the amount of principal, the rate of interest, the quality of collateral, and the time for payment.' 16
Both of these changes seem wise, especially since, as the Comments
indicate, the New Jersey courts can be relied upon to reach an equi115 See Gershaw v. Ther-A-Pedic Sleep Products, 218 N.J. Super. 350, 527 A.2d
923 (App. Div. 1987).
I16 REPORT, supra note 1, at 86.
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table result. It should be noted, however, that even though the dispute is between a minority and majority shareholder, it is at least
theoretically possible that the corporation will be turned over to a
third shareholder who can afford to pay for the shares of both, provided he can afford to pay for their shares, and he too is a party to
the action.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

As is indicated above, the New Jersey Act, as amended by the
recent amendments, largely following the Revised Model Business Corporation Act and the Delaware statute, has become one
of the most liberal in the country. Unlike the Delaware Act" 7
and the Model Act's "Statutory Close Corporation Supplement,"" 8 however, it does not contain any special subchapter devoted solely to close corporations. This may not have been
unwise, in view of the widespread criticism of the inadequacy of
such special close corporation statutes." 9 They have been unpopular and thus have not been widely used by practitioners even
in those jurisdictions where they are authorized. 2 °
The lack of special statutory provisions, however, does pose
certain drafting problems for close corporation lawyers in New
Jersey, because they are faced with some degree of uncertainty as
to whether their draftsmanship will achieve the desired result.
Initially, it is advisable that those provisions which are dangerous, such as the new removal of directors without cause provision
(NJSA 14A:6-6), but which the statute expressly allows to be
countermanded by a contrary certificate of incorporation, be negated, if it is desired to protect minority rights.
Certain other provisions, for example, loans to directors
(NJSA 14:6-11), that may also be undesirable, but which the statute does not expressly allow countermanding, should, at least, be
required to receive unanimous director approval.
Reserving the right to the shareholders to fix the consideration for new shares, with a high vote requirement for approval, as
is also expressly allowed (NJSA 14A:7-4), and forbidding a noncash consideration for shares (NJSA 14A:7-5), where desired, are
also expressly allowed if the certificate so provides.
However, it is possible that what might be characterized as
'17 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 341 (1983).
118 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT STATUTORY CLOSE CORP. SuPP. § 1,

119 See CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 85, at 351-55.
120 Id.

et seq. (1989).
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the "new common law of close corporations" will act as a corrective for the dangers under the Revision, and under the old law,
even without express overriding by the certificate of incorporation or bylaws.
Contrasted with the numerous provisions in the Revision
which are, at least arguably dangerous to close corporations, are:
the clarifying changes in NJSA 14A:5-12, as to high vote requirements; NJSA 14A:5-19(3) apparently allowing arbitration under a
shareholder agreement through the vehicle of an irrevocable
proxy; the very minor change expressly making shareholder
agreements specifically enforceable under NJSA 14A:5-21 (1); the
clarification for the treatment of repurchased shares (NJSA
14A:7-16(8) and (9)); and the changes made under NJSA 14A:127(8) involving involuntary dissolution, all of which are at least
arguably helpful to the close corporation. The same can be said
of the simplified financial provisions discarding, as a consequence, the old complex restrictions imposed on share repurchases and dividends, even though these sections may, to an
extent, reduce the protection given to creditors and
shareholders.
On balance, the anti-close corporation provisions as opposed to pro-close corporation ones is disputable. However, because of the significant dangers of such sections as NJSA 14A:66, the balance seems to weigh in favor of the anti-close corporation provisions.
It would be desirable for the NewJersey statute, and the statutes of all states, to allow a unanimous shareholder agreement to
be a substitute for both the certificate of incorporation and bylaws. This would at least avoid the confusing division among
these documents necessary under present New Jersey law and
that of most other states. The New York rule now appears to
allow that such a unanimous agreement will suffice despite statutory requirements that certain provisions be set forth in the certificate or bylaws. 12 ' This represents a significant policy reversal
from the old New York rule, which was one of the most
hypertechnical in the nation. NewJersey has given a clear indication that the new New York rule will now also be available in New
Jersey.
In the leading case of 68th St. Apartments v. Lauricella, 2 - the
Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 405 N.E.2d 681, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1980).
142 N.J. Super. 546, 362 A.2d 78 (Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 150 N.J. Super. 47,
374 A.2d 1222 (App. Div. 1977).
121

.122
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court upheld an agreement calling for an arrangement not sanctioned by the statute, and decrying what the court called corporate law "technisms" when applied to close corporations which
desire to operate as partnerships by a simple agreement. The
Lauricellacase affirmed that the shareholders were fiduciaries inter
se.
The second leading close corporation case is Exadaktilos v.
Cinneminson Realty Co. 123 There, although denying dissolution on
the ground that no oppression had been show under NJSA
14A: 12-7, the court adopted the "reasonable expectations" test:
The special circumstances, arrangements and personal relationships that frequently underlie the formation of close corporations generate certain expectations among the
shareholders concerning their respective roles in corporate affairs, including management and earnings. These expectations preclude the drawing of any conclusions about the
impact of a particular course of conduct on a shareholder
without taking into consideration the role that he is expected
initially the unto play. Accordingly, a court must determine
124
derstanding of the parties in this regard.
Thus, the minority's co-shareholders must not defeat a shareholder's legitimate expectations when he entered into the venture,
even though not expressly embodied in the corporate documents.
As an example, a co-participant elected to a directorship could
presumably not be removed, despite NJSA 14A:6-6 as amended and
despite the absence of a certificate of incorporation provision forbidding such removal, where his "reasonable expectation" was to
continue in that management-power-financial position when he embarked upon the venture. Needless to say, this interpretation to
protect minority shareholders, even though they have not taken the
trouble to follow the statute, is a desirable one.
An even more recent case, Delspina v. Wescha, Inc.,125 gives further support to the notion of a "common law of close corporations."
Although not involving an ordinary close corporation, the court interpreted Title 14A in a way clearly applicable to them all. Despite
the fact that the statute (NJSA 14A:6-3) provided, and still does, for
shareholder election of directors, and did not expressly provide that
this rule could be modified by the certificate of incorporation, the
court held that this could be modified by unanimous agreement of
123 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (Law Div. 1979), aff'd, 173 N.J. Super. 559,
414 A.2d 994 (App. Div. 1980), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 112, 425 A.2d 273 (1980).
124 Id. at 154-55, 400 A.2d at 561.
125 223 N.J. Super. 84, 583 A.2d 367 (App. Div. 1988).
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the shareholders under NJSA 14A:l-1 (4). The statute provides that
the absence of language expressly allowing a contrary certificate or
bylaw provision in a section does not "imply that the effect of other
provisions may not be varied by provisions in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws," and further, citing NJSA 14A:5-21, that the
unanimous agreement of the shareholders would be valid despite
inconsistent certificate and bylaws provisions, one of' which conflicted with the statutory mandate.
Under this theory, espoused by the Lauricella, Exadaktilos and
Delspina cases, despite corporate "technisms," the understanding
among the participants in a close corporation, their "reasonable expectations," should not prevent their formal, or perhaps even informal, agreement from controlling in spite of deviation from the
statute.
The theory also finds support in the original statutory provision, carried over in the current law:
(2) This act shall be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies.
(3) Underlying purposes and policies of this act are,
among others,
(c) to give special 2recognition
to the legitimate needs of
6
the close corporation.'
It also seems to be the theory of the Commission, which rejected suggestions made by the author and others, for clarification
of NJSA 14A:5-21(2). This is the principal close corporation accommodation in the statute, which allows management of the corporation by persons other than the directors, and abolition of the board.
The Comment states:
The Commission considered and rejected a proposal that
subsection 14A:5-21(2) be amended to state explicitly that the
provisions of this subsection do not constitute the exclusive
method for deviation from statutory norms with respect to
management by the board. The Commission was satisfied that
the language of paragraph 14A:l-l(3)(b) made such a change
unnecessary. That subsection provides that one of the underlying purposes of the Act is
to provide a general corporate form for the conduct
of lawful business with such variations and modifications
from the form so provided as the interested parties in any
corporation may agree upon, subject only to over-riding
126

N.J.

STAT. ANN. §

14A:l-1 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
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interests of this State and of third parties .... 127
Thus, while it would have been desirable, as suggested above, to
amend the statute expressly to allow at least a unanimous shareholder agreement to suffice for any certificate of incorporation or
bylaw provision'12 required under the statutes, such a provision may
not be necessary under the growing "common law of close
corporations."
Needless to say, however, prudent practitioners will guarantee
enforceability by careful compliance with the statutory triform division, among certificate of incorporation, bylaws and agreement expressly mandated by the statute. Thus, as suggested in the
discussion of redeemable shares (NJSA 14A:7-6), the shareholders
of a close corporation should: (1) enter into a unanimous shareholder agreement in which they negate or waive provisions of the
statute which may be harmful to the minority participants, and
adopt those which may be helpful; (2) agree to embody such provisions in the certificate of incorporation (which are less subject to
directors' alteration than the bylaws), and do so; (3) avoid any inconsistency between these certificate provisions and the bylaws
(which should generally mirror the certificate provisions as to these
important matters); (4) require unanimous shareholder (rather than
merely director) approval for any certificate of incorporation
amendments; (5) require unanimous shareholder approval for bylaw
amendments (or additions), which provision should also be in the
certificate and provide for unanimous shareholder approval for any
such bylaw changes, and for any change in this certificate provision;
(6) for those provisions in which the statute does not expressly provide for a countermanding certificate of incorporation (or bylaw)
provision, require a high shareholder, and/or director, vote requirement, also in the certificate.
Hopefully, none of these provisions will be found unacceptable
under the apparently broadened powers of the Department of State.
If they are, the courts can probably be relied on under the new
"close corporation common law" to sustain one of the alternate devices, such as a shareholder agreement, to prevent abuses by the
majority.
The Revision has been enacted primarily with the public issue,
rather than closely held corporations, in mind. The Commission,
however, seems to recognize that close corporations are privileged
to deviate from the normal statutory rules, under the growing
127 REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
128 See supra note 118 at § 22 (dispensing

with the necessity for bylaws).
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"close corporation common law," which will guard against clever
use of the statute, through its legal "technisms," as oppressive devices against shareholders of close corporations. If this assessment
is correct, close corporations in New Jersey have no reason to fear.

